








Former Hill Staffers at the S.E.C. and Other 
Independent Regulatory Commissions 
Brian D. Feinstein† & M. Todd Henderson†† 
The expression “personnel is policy” has become a truism in Wash-
ington. Yet our understanding of how the political branches use appoint-
ments to project influence into the administrative state is incomplete. This 
Article leverages data on almost one-thousand commissioners serving on 
eleven major independent regulatory commissions to chart, for the first 
time, Congress’s growing practice of placing former legislative-branch per-
sonnel onto these entities. We then theorize that this phenomenon is 
rooted in fundamental changes in American politics in recent decades—
and, in turn, that it has deeply affected administrative law and separation-
of-powers dynamics. 
Over the past several decades, the number of commissioners with 
prior service as a lawmaker or congressional staffer increased almost four-
fold. Paradoxically, this sea change occurred during a period in which, ac-
cording to conventional wisdom, Congress’s influence over administration 
declined. We contend that, faced with a set of worsening pathologies in 
Congress, lawmakers turned to appointments to influence policymaking. 
At the same time, congressional atrophy and an increasingly rocky confir-
mation process combined to make executive posts more attractive to Hill 
staffers than to others. 
This influx of staffers-turned-commissioners has, we argue, substan-
tially altered the functioning of these commissions and their place in the 
separation-of-powers system. Congress’s ability to “embed” loyal former 
staffers on commissions can benefit both institutions. From their new po-
sitions, former staffers can both enhance congressional influence over ad-
ministration and provide commissions with valuable insights into the views 
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and priorities of the branch that writes their statutes, sets their budgets, 
and oversees their activities. 
Staffers-turned-commissioners also bring with them political savvy, 
familiarity with the legislative process, and other skills developed on Cap-
itol Hill. Further, as former staffers—steeped in the norms of an increas-
ingly dysfunctional Congress—fill more seats on commissions, these bod-
ies may undergo a degree of acculturation, encouraging more overtly po-
litical behavior among commissioners. 
Our descriptive and theoretical accounts generate two prescriptions. 
First, in evaluating potential appointees, presidents and senators should be 
attuned not only to those individuals’ preferences and expertise, but also 
to their institutional allegiances and potential impact on organizational 
culture. Second, increased congressional influence over independent com-
missions justifies a degree of presidential oversight. If commissioners are 
political actors—grounded in the politics of their congressional principal 
and carriers of Congress’s culture—they should be subject to controls from 
both political branches. 
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Richard Roberts wasn’t your typical Securities and Exchange Com-
missioner. At the time of his appointment in 1990, he was not known to the 
Washington securities bar.1 He arrived at the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) by way of the Washington office of a Mobile, Ala-
bama-based law firm.2  The key fact on his resume was his prior service as 
chief of staff to Senator Richard Shelby, then a first-term senator from Al-
abama and member of the Senate Banking Committee and, before that, a 
backbencher in the House.3 The President nominated Roberts to the SEC 
at Senator Shelby’s urging.4 As Roberts acknowledges, he was “a long-
shot.”5 
Roberts’s status as a congressional staffer-turned-commissioner was 
novel in 1990. Prior to his appointment, only 10 of the 112 then-current and 
former SEC commissioners had Hill experience.6 Today, however, Rob-
erts’s résumé is typical; roughly half of the current members of the most 
consequential independent boards and commissions hail from the halls of 
Congress.7 Since 1980, the number of former staffers serving on independ-
ent commissions has increased more than fourfold; it has nearly tripled in 
the last twenty years alone.8 That rapid increase is remarkable—and it may 
not just impact the functioning of these bodies but also suggest changes in 
our underlying politics that implicate broader policy issues. 
But the story of Commissioner Roberts gives us another reason to be 
interested in the rise of the staffer-to-commissioner pipeline. Roberts did 
not just owe his job on the SEC to Senator Shelby; he tracked his patron’s 
                                                                                                                                             




3. See id.; see also Jeanne Meserve, CNN Access: Former Democrat Explains His Party 
Switch, CNN (May 24, 2001, 6:32 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLI-
TICS/05/24/shelby.switch.cnna/index.html [https://perma.cc/F5XJ-DK87] (quoting Senator 
Shelby, “I was not a committee chairman. I had not flourished in the [Democratic] party [prior to 
1994] . . . I had no position of power.”). 
4. See Stephen Labaton, Wall Street’s Ambitious Top Cop, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 1991), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1991/03/24/magazine/wall-street-s-ambitious-top-cop.html 
[https://perma.cc/CKM7-ASKT]. 
5. Interview by William Thomas with Richard Roberts, Former SEC Comm’r, in Wash-
ington, D.C., SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION HIST. SOC’Y 11 (May 15, 2014), 
http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-5e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/collec-
tion/oral-histories/20140515_Roberts_Richard_T.pdf [https://perma.cc/JF57-KDLL]. 
6. See infra Section I.B (describing data sources for this figure). 
7. See infra Section I.B. 
8. See infra Figure 1. 
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politics. Appointed to fill a Democratic seat on the Commission, Rob-
erts—like Senator Shelby at the time—was a Democrat.9 Then, the day 
after the 1994 election, Senator Shelby announced that he was joining the 
Republican Party.10 Shortly thereafter, Roberts announced that he too was 
switching teams11—making him the first and, to this day, only Commis-
sioner to do so.12 There was no strategic reason for Roberts to make this 
switch.13 Instead, Roberts considered it as an expression of loyalty to Sen-
ator Shelby. “When Senator Shelby changed parties, I changed,” he ex-
plained.14 “At heart, I’d worked for Senator Shelby for most of my life and 
so I just felt like that was the place for me to be.”15 If today’s staffers-
turned-commissioners display a similar degree of loyalty to their political 
patrons on Capitol Hill, then this development may pull these independent 
agencies towards Congress. 
Another development makes the picture we are starting to paint even 
more interesting. Over the past few decades, both chambers of Congress 
have become increasingly polarized, adversarial, and dysfunctional.16 This 
Article advances the idea that these dual phenomena—growing partisan 
dysfunction in Congress and more Hill alumni running independent agen-
cies—may be linked. With Congress’s lawmaking function diminished, sen-
ators turn to the appointment of like-minded, loyal staffers, like Roberts, 
as an alternative means of influencing policy. At the same time, Congress’s 
pathologies have altered the pool of potential appointees, making a posi-
tion off the Hill more attractive for congressional staffers and less attrac-
tive for those employed outside of politics or the Beltway. 
                                                                                                                                             
9. Robb, supra note 1. 
10. See Senators Who Changed Parties During Senate Service (Since 1890), U.S. SENATE 
https://www.senate.gov/senators/SenatorsWhoChangedPartiesDuringSenateService.htm 
[https://perma.cc/ZTZ6-DV2F]. 
11. Thomas, supra note 5, at 30. 
12. See SEC Historical Summary of Chairmen and Commissioners, U.S. SEC. & EX-
CHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/about/sechistoricalsummary.htm 
[https://perma.cc/7TPP-LHY2]. 
13. Because there was already one vacant seat and Roberts’s term would expire in nine 
months, his switch did not force President Clinton to appoint an additional Democrat to the Com-
mission to adhere to the Commission’s partisan balance requirement. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) 
(2018) (“Not more than three [of five] . . . commissioners shall be members of the same political 
party.”). Neither did his switch appear to be opportunistic; he did not work in politics or govern-
ment again after his term ended nine months later. See Richard Y. Roberts: Biography, ROBERTS 
RAHEB & GRADLER LLC, https://www.rrg-llc.com/images/RickLongBio.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UK3H-WNBS]. 
14. Thomas, supra note 5.  
15. Id. 
16. See Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolar-
ized Democracy in America, 99 CAL. L. REV. 273, 276-81 (2011); see also id. at 323-24 (summa-





The increasing partisanship of Capitol Hill may not just make con-
gressional staffers more attractive appointees, but may also alter the func-
tioning of the agencies they now help run. Staffers-turned-commissioners 
likely bring to agencies the very pathologies of the Hill that made them 
leave in the first place. For instance, whereas the SEC was once seen 
mostly as a model of nonpartisan efficiency, contemporary observers, in-
cluding recent chairs Arthur Levitt and Mary Schapiro, view it as divided 
by faction and increasingly dysfunctional.17 These developments may be 
traceable in part to the rise of staffers-turned-commissioners transmitting 
Congress’s partisan culture to independent agencies. 
The staffers-turned-commissioners phenomenon also may yield sev-
eral important benefits to both Congress and the affected commissions. 
Congress may profit from the presence of its former staffers on independ-
ent commissions, since they can transmit information to Congress at lower 
cost. Relatedly, staffers-turned-commissioners may leverage their preex-
isting relationships with legislators to their agencies’ benefit—in essence, 
engaging in relationship-based lobbying. To the extent that staffers-
turned-commissioners were exposed to mass politics from their time on 
Capitol Hill, their presence may inject a measure of democratic respon-
siveness into agency decision making. Finally, staffers-turned-commission-
ers may import to the agencies valuable skills learned on the Hill. For in-
stance, their greater understanding of the lawmaking process and legisla-
tive intent may improve the rulemaking capacity of their agencies, and 
their political instincts may enable their agencies to achieve their objec-
tives in an increasingly partisan climate. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the legal land-
scape concerning experiential or credential requirements for appointees 
and documents, for the first time, the growing prevalence of staffers-
turned-commissioners. Part II posits two causes of this trend: first, that 
Congress, mindful of the maxim that personnel is policy, has turned to ap-
pointing its loyalists to agencies as its direct influence on policymaking has 
waned; and second, that congressional dysfunction has skewed the pool of 
potential appointees towards Hill staffers. Part III considers potential con-
sequences of the rise of staffers-turned-commissioners. Part IV draws out 
prescriptive implications of our findings. 
                                                                                                                                             
17. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Chief Pursues Tougher Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES: 
(Feb. 22, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/23/business/23schapiro.html 
[https://perma.cc/HCT7-K8PG] (quoting former SEC Chair Arthur Levitt Jr.’s observation that 
the SEC “since it was formed, was always known as nonpartisan and free of interference from the 
White House,” but that “[i]n recent years that changed”); id. (characterizing incoming chair Mary 
Schapiro as desiring to eliminate “partisan politics” from the SEC to restore its credibility”). 
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I. Law and Practice 
A. Legal Framework 
There are few constitutional constraints on the identities or charac-
teristics of individuals whom the President and Senate may appoint to prin-
cipal offices.18 Among the few restrictions are that members of Congress 
cannot serve in executive positions.19 Laws that entrust Congress or partic-
ular legislators with the power to name individuals to executive positions 
are also unconstitutional.20 Statutory mechanisms that overly constrain the 
President’s choice set—such as by requiring that the President select nom-
inees from a list curated by Congress—are also impermissible.21 
Within these broad parameters—and over the objections of some 
presidents22 and scholars,23 courts grant Congress wide latitude to impose 
character-and-credential requirements on appointees to certain offices.24 
Congress has taken advantage of the relative lack of judicial constraints in 
this area, inserting experiential requirements in many agencies’ organic 
                                                                                                                                             
18. By contrast, the Supreme Court takes a more active role in other aspects of the law 
of appointments. See, e.g., Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2051 (2018) (elucidating the line between 
“Officers of the United States,” who must be installed pursuant to the Appointments Clause, and 
employees); Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014) (determining when 
recess appointments are permitted); Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659-660 (1997) (ex-
pounding on the distinction between principal officers, whom only the President may appoint, 
with the advice and consent of the Senate, and inferior officers). 
19. See Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 
501 U.S. 252, 274 (1991). 
20. See id.; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126-40 (1976); Springer v. Gov’t of Philippine 
Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 202 (1928). 
21. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 (1986); Hechinger v. Metro. Wash. Airports 
Auth., 36 F.3d 97, 100-01, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
22. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Department of Homeland Security Appropria-
tions Act, 2007, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1742, 1742-43 (Oct. 4, 2006) (asserting that the 
Act “purports to limit the qualifications of the pool of persons from whom the President may 
select the [FEMA Administrator] in a manner that rules out a large portion of those persons best 
qualified,” and, thus, “[t]he executive branch shall construe [it] in a manner consistent with the 
Appointments Clause”); Statement on Signing the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 PUB. PA-
PERS 1907, 1907 (Dec. 19, 1995) (“Congress may not . . . impose broad restrictions on the Presi-
dent’s constitutional prerogative to nominate persons of his choosing to the highest executive 
branch positions.”). 
23. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Toward a Comprehensive Understanding of the Federal 
Appointments Process, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 467, 534-35 (1998); Donald J. Kochan, 
The Unconstitutionality of Class-Based Statutory Limitations on Presidential Nominations: Can 
a Man Head the Women’s Bureau at the Department of Labor?, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 43, 46 (2005); 
Hannah Metchis Volokh, The Two Appointments Clauses: Statutory Qualifications for Federal 
Officers, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745 (2008). 
24. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 128-31 (1926) (noting, in dictum, that statu-
tory qualifications requirements are permitted, provided that they “do not so limit selection and 
so trench upon executive choice as to be in effect legislative designation”); id. at 264-65 (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting) (similar point); Fed. Election Comm’n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 





statutes. These requirements fall into two conceptually distinct categories: 
mandates that appointees possess expertise in the relevant subject mat-
ter—with professional credentials usually serving as a proxy for exper-
tise—and requirements aimed at promoting certain perspectives among 
appointees. 
Expertise-promoting requirements are the more familiar category. 
They date to the Judiciary Act of 1789, passed by the First Congress, which 
required the Attorney General and U.S. attorneys to be “learned in the 
law.”25 Congress imposed similar requirements for professional qualifica-
tions or experiences across executive branch offices throughout the nine-
teenth century.26 
During the Progressive and New Deal eras, these requirements pro-
liferated within the executive branch. A central tenet of public administra-
tion theory during this period was scientific management, the notion that 
the administrative state could and should be managed by neutral techno-
crats divorced from politics.27 To that end, reformers added credential re-
quirements to offices across the administrative state.28 Moreover, fixed 
terms for independent regulatory commissioners were justified as enabling 
appointees to gain expertise through experience on the commission.29 
Today, expertise requirements are present throughout administra-
tion. Members of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board must be “re-
spected experts in . . .  nuclear safety with a demonstrated competence and 
knowledge relevant to [the Board’s work].”30 At least one member of the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation must have previously served as a 
state banking supervisor.31 The Director of the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency must “have a demonstrated understanding of financial manage-
ment or oversight, and . . . of capital markets, including the mortgage secu-
rities markets and housing finance.”32 Similar requirements concerning 
“professional standing and demonstrated knowledge in the field[]” re-
quirements exist for positions within the Surface Transportation Board,33 
                                                                                                                                             
25. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 93 (1789). Today, the Solicitor General 
is subject to a similar requirement. See 28 U.S.C. § 505 (2018). 
26. See Myers, 272 U.S. at 265-74 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (collecting statutes). 
27. See Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and 
Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1133-34 (2000). 
28. See id. 
29. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 624-25 (1935); see also Rachel 
E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 
15, 29 (2010). 
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2286(b)(1) (2018). 
31. 12 U.S.C. § 1812(a)(1)(C) (2018). 
32. 12 U.S.C. § 4512(b)(1) (2018). 
33. 49 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(2)(A) (2018). 
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Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),34 Postal Regulatory 
Commission,35 Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission,36 and 
Office of Special Counsel,37 among other offices.38 
The second category of requirements promotes the representation of 
specific perspectives on administrative bodies. Most notably, twenty-three 
multimember commissions require partisan balance among their mem-
bers; in most cases, only a bare majority may hail from the same political 
party.39 Partisan-balance requirements have yielded real ideological diver-
sity on commissions, with Republican presidents generally appointing 
bona fide liberals for Democratic seats, and Democratic presidents ap-
pointing true conservatives to Republican seats.40 Accordingly, these re-
quirements ensure that certain political views are represented on commis-
sion daises regardless of the party controlling the White House.41 
Other membership requirements promote viewpoint representation 
in more subtle ways. The composition of the Federal Reserve Board of 
Governors (the Fed) must include “fair representation of . . . financial, ag-
riculture, industrial, and commercial interests . . . .”42 At least two out of 
                                                                                                                                             
34. See 6 U.S.C. § 313(c)(2)(A) (2018). Following Hurricane Katrina, Congress added a 
requirement that FEMA’s administrator possess at least five years of “executive leadership and 
management experience.” Id. § 313(c)(2)(B), as added by Pub. L. No. 109-295, Title VI, § 611(11), 
120 Stat. 1355, 1397 (2006); see also LOUIS FISHER, THE LAW OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH: PRES-
IDENTIAL POWER 132 (2014) (noting that Congress amended the statute in response to FEMA’s 
emergency-response performance following that disaster). 
35. See 39 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2018). 
36. See 29 U.S.C. § 661(a) (2018). 
37. See 5 U.S.C. § 1211(b) (2018). 
38. Oddly, some statutes merely require that the President “consider” appointing indi-
viduals with relevant experiences or credentials. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1752a(b)(2)(A) (2018) 
(providing that, in selecting National Credit Union Administration board members, “the Presi-
dent shall give consideration to individuals who, by virtue of their education, training, or experi-
ence relating to a broad range of financial services . . . are especially qualified to serve on the 
Board”); 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a) (2018) (requiring the President to “consider” for the Consumer 
Product Safety Commission individuals with “background and expertise in areas related to con-
sumer products and protection of the public from risks to safety”). 
39. See Brian D. Feinstein & Daniel J. Hemel, Partisan Balance with Bite, 118 COLUM. 
L. REV. 9, 31, 41 (2018) (identifying the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Federal Com-
munications Commission, and twenty-one other boards and commissions with partisan-balance 
requirements). 
40. See id. at 14. 
41. See Daniel E. Ho, Congressional Agency Control: The Impact of Statutory Partisan 
Requirements on Regulation 1-3 (Feb. 12, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), https://law.be-
press.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2219&context=alea [https://perma.cc/4V3J-NPGA] 
(“[T]he effect of [FCC] [C]ommissioner ideology on voting is profound. Commissioner partisan 
affiliation exhibits robust and large predictive power over votes, even holding constant the party 
of the appointing president.”). 
42. 12 U.S.C. § 241 (2018). The Board also must be geographically balanced and include 
least one member with “demonstrated primary experience working in or supervising [small] com-





the five members of the Surface Transportation Board must possess pri-
vate-sector experience.43 By contrast, Congress actively discourages pri-
vate-sector views on the National Credit Union Administration, where 
“[n]ot more than one” out of the three board members may hail from a 
credit union.44 
At first glance, these industry-representation requirements may ap-
pear as merely another way to ensure that various forms of expertise are 
present on commissions. But they go beyond that purpose. For instance, 
an individual can possess expertise concerning the financial sector without 
being a “representat[ive] of . . . financial . . . interests,”45 as the Fed’s statute 
requires. By mandating appointments from industry—rather than from the 
broader category of experts concerning that industry, such as academics 
and civil servants, these provisions ensure that certain industry or interest-
group perspectives are included on commissions. Accordingly, the drafters 
of these provisions presumably understood that a commissioner’s employ-
ment history can influence her current policy outlook.46 
Some representational requirements are even more specific. The Sec-
retary of Defense cannot have served in the military during the preceding 
seven years;47 the Federal Reserve Board48 and the central bank’s Federal 
Open Market Committee (FOMC) both must be geographically bal-
anced;49 two seats on the three-person National Indian Gaming Commis-
sion are reserved for enrolled members of a Native American tribe;50 and 
the Director of the Women’s Bureau of the Department of Labor must be 
a woman.51 
                                                                                                                                             
43. See 49 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(2)(B) (2018). 
44. 12 U.S.C. § 1752a(b)(2)(B) (2018). 
45. Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 241 (2018).  
46. Cf. Rufus E. Miles, Jr., The Origin and Meaning of Miles’ Law, 38 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 
399 (1978) (discussing the origins of the aphorism “[w]here you stand depends on where you sit”). 
47. See 10 U.S.C. § 113(a) (“A person may not be appointed as Secretary of Defense 
within seven years after relief from active duty as a commissioned officer of a regular component 
of an armed force.”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2286(b)(1) (requiring that Defense Nuclear Facilities 
Safety Board members be “from civilian life”). The Senate has waived the civilian Defense Sec-
retary requirement in the recent past, see, e.g., Act of Jan. 20, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-2, 131 Stat. 6 
(waiving the provision as applied to General James Mattis), and could waive requirements con-
cerning other offices as well. Alternatively, perhaps the Senate could simply ignore these require-
ments if it so chose, because judicial challenges to confirmation decisions arguably are nonjustici-
able. 
48. See 12 U.S.C. § 241 (2018) (mandating that no more than one Board member be 
appointed from any one Federal Reserve District and that the President consider “fair represen-
tation of . . . geographical divisions of the country”). 
49. See 12 U.S.C. § 263(a) (2018) (providing that the directors of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York select one of the twelve members of the FOMC, and the directors of the other 
eleven regional Reserve Banks select four additional FOMC members). 
50. 25 U.S.C. § 2704 (2018). 
51. See 29 U.S.C. § 12 (2018). 
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By imposing these unambiguous representational requirements, Con-
gress acknowledges the importance of identity and past experiences in 
shaping one’s perspective. There are without a doubt many talented and 
knowledgeable candidates who could fill these roles but do not meet the 
above requirements. By imposing these restrictions, Congress is signaling 
that there is something about having certain experiences or traits—as a ci-
vilian in a defense position, as a central banker outside of the Acela corri-
dor, as a Native American, or as a woman—that provides an individual 
with a different expected perspective, from a similarly credentialed person 
without that experience or trait. 
So too, we contend, does Congress have a similar perspective on the 
experience of serving as a congressional staffer.52 In Part II, we argue that 
Congress has shown an increasing propensity to place its former staffers 
on independent regulatory commissions, based in part on legislators’ belief 
that these staffers’ service to Congress, and ties that they maintain with 
their former colleagues on the Hill, will engender loyalty to that institution. 
In Part III, we describe how staffers-turned-commissioners’ acculturation 
in Congress has in fact changed the working culture of their agencies. But 
first, we detail the growing prominence of former congressional staffers on 
independent regulatory commissions. 
B. The Congress-to-Commission Phenomenon 
Today, the presence of former congressional staffers on the daises of 
multimember commissions and boards is common. Two out of the five cur-
rent commissioners of the SEC are former senior staffers on the Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (Senate Banking 
Committee).53 Two of the four current members of the National Labor Re-
                                                                                                                                             
52. Could Congress pass a law requiring, for example, that the President fill certain seats 
“from among former legislators or legislative staff”? Almost certainly—provided that Congress 
did not attempt to fill the seats with current lawmakers. See Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citi-
zens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S. 252, 267 (1991) (invalidating this practice on 
separation-of-powers grounds). The illustrative language tracks other existing experiential re-
quirements. See 12 U.S.C. § 635a(c)(8)(B) (2018) (requiring that at least one board member of 
the Export-Import Bank “be selected from among the small business community and . . . represent 
the interests of small business”). But, considering that former staffers are appointed to these po-
sitions in growing numbers without such statutory requirements, why call attention to the practice 
by enshrining it in statute? 
53. Hester Peirce served as senior counsel to the Senate Banking Committee under 
Chairman Richard Shelby (R-AL). Commissioner Hester M. Pierce, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/biography/commissioner-hester-m-peirce 
[https://perma.cc/XF72-P7Q6]. Kara Stein served as senior policy advisor for securities and bank-
ing policy to Senator Jack Reed (D-RI) and staff director of the Securities, Insurance and Invest-





lations Board (NLRB) are former senior congressional staffers with expe-
rience on labor committees.54 As Table 1 shows, Capitol Hill alumni are 
well-represented on most of the other major independent boards and com-
missions. (For simplicity, we adopt the term “commission” to refer to any 
multimember agency and “commissioner” to refer to any member of one 
of these agencies.) 
 
Table 1: Composition of Independent Regulatory Commissions55 
 
































                                                                                                                                             
& EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/biography/stein-kara-m 
[https://perma.cc/Y7KW-8C2Z]. 
54. Lauren McFerran served as chief labor counsel and deputy staff director of the Sen-
ate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP), and senior labor counsel to 
Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) and Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA). Lauren McFerran, NAT’L 
LAB. REL. BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/bio/lauren-mcferran [https://perma.cc/2YL9-G75V]. 
Marvin Kaplan served as counsel to the House Committee on Oversight and Reform and as policy 
counsel to the House Committee on Education and Labor. Marvin E. Kaplan, NAT’L LAB. REL. 
BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/board/marvin-e-kaplan [https://perma.cc/LQY9-
25Q9]. 
55. Data obtained via agency websites and other online biographies, and is current as of 
July 31, 2020. 
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TOTAL 21 44 
 
Among the multimember independent agencies included in Table 1, 
twenty-one out of forty-four commissioners and board members (forty-
eight percent) had previous experience working for Congress. Typically, 
this experience involved a senior policy role on a House or Senate com-
mittee with authorization and oversight jurisdiction over the relevant 
agency. 
How does the present level of representation of former Hill staffers 
on commissions compare to historical practice? To answer this question, 
we leverage data on the biographies of commissioners and board members 
on the eleven major commissions and boards included in Table 1. 
We start with Professor David Nixon’s Independent Regulatory 
Commission Database. Nixon identifies every former member of Congress 
or congressional staffer who later served on one of the eleven commissions 
listed in Table 1 through 2000.56 The Federal Trade Commission and Fed-
eral Reserve Board were the first of these eleven commissions to be estab-
lished, both in 1914.57 Accordingly, our analysis begins in that year. We 
                                                                                                                                             
56. David C. Nixon, Independent Regulatory Commissioner Database, 1887-2000, IN-
TER-UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM FOR POL. & SOC. RES. (Sept. 25, 2007), 
https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/4221 [https://perma.cc/EB4G-NLWW]. 
Specifically, Nixon codes for whether each commissioner served as a congressional staffer or held 
a “federal elective office” in one of the individual’s four previous positions. See David C. Nixon, 
Codebook for Independent Regulatory Commissioner Data Base, INDEPENDENT REGULATORY 
COMMISSIONER DATA BASE 7 (Mar. 10, 2005), http://www2.hawaii.edu/~dnixon/IRC/irc_code-
book_110.pdf [https://perma.cc/V5FV-FJD3]. In practice, the only former federal elected officials 
to later serve as commissioners are former members of Congress. 
57. See Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-203, 52 Stat. 111; Federal 





then scoured agency and professional websites, LinkedIn profiles, and 
other online sources to extend Nixon’s classifications from 2001 to 2018. In 
all, we obtained data on 977 commissioners serving on these eleven com-
missions.58 
Figure 1 displays the results of this effort: the first look at the growth 
of the Congress-to-commission pipeline. Each dot indicates the proportion 
of commissioners with Hill experience that were appointed in a given 
year.59 The figure displays a loess curve in blue, along with associated 
ninety-five percent confidence intervals in gray.60  Figure 1 reveals an over-
all slight decrease in the proportion of new commissioners with Hill expe-
rience from the New Deal era to the 1980s, followed by an increase that 
accelerates into the 2000s. 
                                                                                                                                             
governance structure and functions and changed its name to the “Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System.” See Banking Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-305, § 203, 49 Stat. 684, 704-05. 
For purposes of this analysis, we consider the latter entity to be a continuation of the former. 
58. The included members and years for each of the eleven commissions are: CPSC 
(thirty-nine members, 1972-2018); EEOC (fifty-seven members, 1965-2018); FCC (123 members, 
1934-2018); FEC (fifty members, 1975-2018); Federal Reserve (119 members, 1914-2018); FERC 
(fifty-six members, 1977-2018); FTC (114 members, 1914-2018); NLRB (110 members 1935-2018); 
NRC (108 members, 1974-2018); NTSB (sixty members, 1967-2018); SEC (141 members, 1935-
2018). 
59. By focusing exclusively on new appointees, Figure 1 eliminates a key source of auto-
correlation present in the loess curve in Figure 2, which shows the proportion of commissioners 
with Hill experience serving in a given year.  Consider the career of Michael O’Rielly, a longtime 
advisor to several members of Congress and congressional committees who began serving as an 
FCC Commissioner in 2013. See Michael O’Rielly, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, 
https://www.fcc.gov/about/leadership/mike-orielly#bio [https://perma.cc/A9KN-U89T]. Commis-
sioners serve fixed terms and rarely resign in their second year, so O’Rielly’s presence in our da-
taset in 2013 essentially perfectly predicts his presence in 2014. More generally, his presence or 
absence in any given year in our dataset is highly correlated with his presence or absence in the 
previous year. Thus, the observations in our dataset are not independent. Instead, whether the 
individual holding commission seat c at time t has prior Hill experience is serially correlated with 
whether the individual holding seat c at t-1 has prior Hill experience. 
After eliminating an important source of non-independence among commissioner-year observa-
tions, the loess curve in Figure 1 exhibits markedly less autocorrelation than that in Figure 2; the 
value of the function for a one-year lag in Figure 2 is 0.882 versus 0.125 in Figure 1. 
60. A loess curve is a locally weighted, non-parametric regression line; essentially, a trend 
line. 




Figure 1: Proportion of New Commissioners with Hill Experience 
 
Given the significant year-to-year variation in the proportion of newly 
appointed commissioners with Hill experience, Figure 1 is somewhat 
lumpy. 
Figure 2 provides another perspective on these data. Whereas Figure 
1 illustrates the proportion of commissioners with Hill experience ap-
pointed in a given year, Figure 2 shows the proportion of currently serving 







Figure 2: Proportion of Commissioners with Hill Experience 
 
As the figure shows, this proportion remained relatively steady 
throughout most of the twentieth century, exhibiting a slight, gradual 
decline from around 1940 to 1980. Although the figure fluctuated con-
siderably during the 1980s through the early 2000s, the general trend 
was positive.  Around 2005, however, the proportion of commissioners 
with Hill experience changed dramatically. In that year, the figure 
jumped from 17%—around where it had hovered for the previous dec-
ade—to 31%. By 2009, the figure reached its global maximum: 53%. 
For the next ten years, the figure fluctuated between 33% and 45%. 
Figures 1 and 2 reveal a clear time trend in the proportion of com-
missioners with previous Hill experience: an overall slight decrease in 
this proportion from the New Deal era to the 1980s, followed by an 
increase that accelerates into the 2000s.  Both figures illustrate that 
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there has been a marked and sustained influx from Capitol Hill onto 
multimember independent agencies in the past fifteen years or so.61 
Still, there are two plausible alternative explanations to a time 
trend. First, a handful of outlier agencies could be driving these results, 
with most agencies not exhibiting this trend. Second, divided govern-
ment—which has become a more frequent occurrence in recent dec-
ades62—could explain the phenomenon. When different parties control 
the Senate and White House, Senate leadership lacks partisan or elec-
toral incentives to acquiesce to presidential demands and instead 
adopts a more assertive posture.63 If Senate leadership has always fa-
vored appointing legislative branch staffers to executive agencies, and 
Senate leadership is more assertive during divided government,64 then 
we would expect to see a higher proportion of Hill staffers appointed 
to executive agencies during periods of divided government. That di-
vided government has become more common over time raises the pos-
sibility that what we interpret as a time trend in the proportion of com-
missioners with previous Hill experience may instead be reflecting an 
omitted variable: the presence of divided government.65 
To examine the relative roles that (1) a time trend, (2) outlier 
agencies, and (3) the presence or absence of divided government play 
in the growth of the Hill-to-agency pipeline, we regress whether a given 
commissioner has Hill experience on (1) the year in which the individ-
ual was appointed; (2) the agency to which he or she was appointed; 
and (3) whether different parties controlled the presidency and Senate 
at the time of appointment. 
Because there is no clear-cut way to model the nonlinear trend line 
in Figures 1 and 2, we take three approaches. Model 1 estimates a linear 
                                                                                                                                             
61. This trend is consistent with Professor Daniel Ho’s observation that, whereas no FCC 
commissioners had previous experience as congressional staffers between 1965 and 1979, fourteen 
percent of FCC commissioners had such experience between 1980 and 2006. See Ho, supra note 
41, at 29. 
Examining individual figures for each of the eleven included agencies shows that the general trend 
observed in Figures 1 and 2 is clearly present for the CPSC, EEOC, FCC, Fed, NTSB, NRC, and 
SEC. The trend is also present for the FEC, FTC, and NLRB in recent decades only, with the 
proportion of commissioners with Hill experience increasing at the FEC and FTC since the mid-
1990s and at the NRLB since the early 1970s. The trend is not present for the NLRB. 
62. The Pearson correlation coefficient for the Year and Divided Government variables 
introduced infra, Table 2, is 0.190. 
63. See DAVID E. LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS: POLITICAL 
CONTROL AND BUREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE 60-66 (2008) (reporting that the proportion of 
new agencies with limitations on appointments is higher under divided government); DAVID EP-
STEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST POLITICS AP-
PROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 77-78 (1999) (finding that Congress 
places greater constraints on executive agencies’ discretion under divided government). 
64. See supra note 63. 





regression model for appointments between 1980 and 2018. This sec-
tion of the loess curve in Figure 1 approximates a linear function, mak-
ing linear regression more appropriate. Models 2 and 3, by contrast, use 
nonparametric forms to model the entire 1914-2018 period. Model 2 
transforms the Year variable into a cubic polynomial (Year, Year2, 
Year3); this transformation provides the closest approximation to the 
nonparametric plot in Figure 1.66 Finally, Model 3 employs a spline re-
gression model, in which each segment of a polynomial function is esti-
mated separately.67 Internal breakpoints at the years 1930 and 1972—
the approximate internal local maximum and local minimum, respec-
tively, of the curve in Figure 1—establish the three segments of the 
spline. 
Finally, Model 4, which is unreported, presents an alternative 
spline regression model with an additional breakpoint at 2004. Because 
Figure 2 exhibits a substantial discontinuity around 2004, this model 
tests whether the post-2004 period completely drives any observed time 
trend. 68 
These models also include a Divided Govt covariate, which de-
notes whether different political parties controlled the Senate and pres-
idency in a given year, as well as agency fixed effects. Table 2 reports 
the results. 
                                                                                                                                             
66. Per convention, this function also includes linear and quadratic terms (i.e. Year and 
Year2, as well as Year3). As a check, we computed Akaike information criterion (AIC) and ad-
justed R-squared values for first-, second-, third-, and fourth-degree polynomial transformations 
of Year. We found that the third-degree polynomial produced the largest R-squared value and 
was trivially larger than the lowest AIC value. Accordingly, using the third-degree polynomial is 
most appropriate. See John H. McDonald, Handbook of Biological Statistics, SPARKY HOUSE 
PUB. 217 (2014), http://www.biostathandbook.com/HandbookBioStatThird.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TVX5-X58H]. 
67. See Jeffrey S. Racine, A Primer on Regression Splines, COMPREHENSIVE R AR-
CHIVE NETWORK, https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/crs/vignettes/spline_primer.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GZK2-Y7XW]. 
68. This fourth model reports positive, substantially large, and statistically significant co-
efficient estimates for both the 1973-2004 and 2005-2018 periods, which indicates that the discon-
tinuity around 2004 observed in Figure 2 is not driving the results. 
To further assess whether any system-wide feature caused the jump around 2004 in Figure 2, we 
produced separate versions of that figure for each commission. As the figures show, all commis-
sions except one exhibit a general increase in the proportion of staffers-turned-commissioners in 
the last several decades. Given the small number of observations for individual commissions, we 
do not make much of these single-commission results. But, at the very least, they do not suggest 
that any system-wide phenomenon is present around 2004. 
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Table 2: Staffers-Turned-Commissioners Over Time 
 































Agency Fixed  
Effects 
Y Y Y 
Unit of analysis: appointments and reappointments to eleven boards and 
commissions. Dependent variable: whether the appointment is filled by an 
individual who previously worked for or served in Congress. Model: logistic 
regression (all models); Model 2 contains a third-degree polynomial trans-
formation of Year (Year & Year2 terms included in model, but unreported 
in table); Model 3 employs regression splines at 1914-1930, 1931-1972, and 
1973-2018. Agency covariates modeled as fixed effects. Period: 1980-2018 
(Model 1); 1914-2018 (Model 2); 1914-2018 (Model 3). Observations: 459 
(Model 1); 977 (Model 2); 977 (Model 3). Pseudo-R2: 0.142 (Model 1); 0.118 
(Model 2); 0.111 (Model 3). *** signifies p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † 
p < 0.10. 
 
That the coefficient estimates for Divided Govt are negative and do 
not reach conventionally accepted levels of statistical significance is not 
consistent with an argument that more frequent divided government is 
driving the trend of former Hill staffers serving as commissioners. We can-
not, however, reject the null hypothesis that the presence of divided gov-
ernment has no bearing on the placement of Hill staffers on these agencies. 
The potential lack of association between divided government and 




debate over the extent to which lawmakers are loyal to Congress as their 
home institution or to their political party, and thus less willing to engage 
in Madisonian interbranch competition with a same-party President.69 
That the staffers-to-commissioners trend increases year after year, during 
periods of unified as well as divided government—and, we posit, in re-
sponse to growing presidential power in other areas—suggests that legisla-
tors’ institutional loyalty to Congress can trump their partisan or ideologi-
cal affiliations. 
More notably for our purposes, the positive and mostly statistically 
significant coefficient estimates for the time-related variables suggest the 
presence of a time trend. Controlling for any agency-specific effects or the 
presence of divided or unified government, the proportion of commission-
ers with prior Hill experience tends to increase over time.70 
The use of a logit model precludes straightforward interpretation of 
the magnitude of this trend. Accordingly, we transform several key coeffi-
cient estimates into predicted probabilities.71 The following figure charts 
                                                                                                                                             
69. Compare David Fontana & Aziz Z. Huq, Institutional Loyalties in Constitutional 
Law, 85 CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (2018) (arguing that institutional loyalties persist and may still influence 
the behavior of federal officials), with Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Par-
ties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2329 (2006) (contending that party loyalty drives in-
terbranch dynamics and concluding that interbranch competition is apparent when government is 
divided but is suppressed when government is unified). 
70. To account for the possibility that features of the political environment apart from 
the presence of divided or unified government drive these results, we estimated several alternative 
model specifications. First, we re-ran Model 1 in Table 2 with fixed effects for each President and 
Senate Majority Leader pair during the period. (This model omitted the Divided Govt covariate 
to avoid perfect multicollinearity. In addition, because Senator Trent Lott and Senator Harry Reid 
split majority-leader duties in 2001, we ran the analysis twice, coding 2001 for Senator Lott in the 
first specification and for Senator Reid in the second.) Only the estimate for the George W. Bush-
Bill Frist fixed effect (2003-2006), which was positive, approached conventionally accepted levels 
of statistical significance (p = 0.089). Second, we re-ran the model with fixed effects for each pair 
of the President and the Senate leader of the other party than the President’s. Here, only the 
George W. Bush-Harry Reid estimate (2005-2008), which also was positive, approached statistical 
significance at conventional levels (p = 0.067). Third, we re-ran the model with dummy variables 
for a Republican President, GOP Senate majority, and the interaction of the two. (This model also 
omitted Divided Govt for the same reason as above.) Here, only the interaction term, which once 
again was positive, approached conventionally accepted levels of statistical significance (p = 
0.086). In sum, virtually every coefficient estimate in these three models suggests a null result. In 
all three models, the only estimates that approach conventionally accepted levels of statistical sig-
nificance correspond to the mid-2000s. That the mid-2000s is late in the study period is consistent 
with our claim that a time trend best explains these data. 
 Neither is it the case that congressional staffing levels have risen, thereby creating a deeper 
pool of qualified candidates for executive positions. In fact, congressional employment figures 
have dropped precipitously over the past several decades. See Vital Statistics on Congress, 
BROOKINGS INST. 1 tbl. 5-1 (2017) https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/vital-
stats_ch5_full.pdf [https://perma.cc/XRS5-XRFT] (reporting a secular decline in policy-focused 
committee positions, from 3,437 in 1979 to 2,262 in 2012). 
71. See TIM FUTING LIAO, INTERPRETING PROBABILITY MODELS: LOGIT, PROBIT, 
AND OTHER GENERALIZED LINEAR MODELS 11-21 (1994). In Model 1, for instance, the pre-
dicted probability of a new appointee in 1980 having prior Hill experience is 6.5% (with a 95% 
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the growth over the past several decades in the predicted probability that 
a new appointee will have prior Hill experience. 
 
Figure 3: Predicted Probability that a New Appointee Has Hill  
Experience 
 
Generating individual predicted probability figures for each of the 
eleven agencies yields broadly similar results.72 The conclusion from these 
analyses is clear: the past several decades have witnessed a significant and 
sustained increase in the appointment of former congressional staffers to 
these agencies. Where once it was rare to find Hill staffers on the daises of 
independent commissions and boards, today they figure prominently. 
II. Causes 
What is the cause of the rise of the former Hill staffer serving on in-
dependent commissions? We propose that it is not coincidental that this 
trend occurred in the midst of a period in which Congress’s relative role in 
                                                                                                                                             
confidence interval of 3.2% to 9.8%). By 2018, that figure is 48.0% (with a 95% confidence inter-
val of 38.1% to 58.8%). 
72. For the EEOC and FEC figures, however, the lower bounds of the confidence inter-
vals hover around zero for the full 1980-2018 period. 
 


























governance otherwise has been in retreat.73 Reacting to their declining 
power to achieve their desired ends through traditional legislative pro-
cesses,74 lawmakers sought out other means of influence. Placing Hill staff-
ers on commissions constitutes a relatively low-cost pathway to exercising 
power in our current milieu. 
Counterintuitively, Congress’s own pathologies may have led it to fo-
cus on appointments. Congressional dysfunction could make the Congress-
to-agency pathway more attractive for two reasons.75 First, with a waning 
role in direct governance, Congress may place greater emphasis on ensur-
ing that individuals who actually set policy have substantial ties to the leg-
islative branch. Second, with the material and psychic rewards for working 
on the Hill declining, high-level congressional staffers may feel the pull of 
multimember agencies more today than in the past. In the following two 
subsections, we consider these two potential pathways in turn. 
A. Demand-Side 
In this section, we outline several reasons why Congress’s demand for 
former Hill staffers to serve as commissioners on independent agencies 
may have increased in the past few decades. We then test these theories 
against available data. 
1. Interbranch Dynamics 
With Congress’s exercise of its traditional lawmaking and oversight 
functions diminished, lawmakers may view appointing allies onto inde-
pendent agencies as an alternative means of exercising influence. In recent 
                                                                                                                                             
73. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUB-
LIC (2010); THOMAS MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: HOW CONGRESS 
IS FAILING AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK 97 (2006); Jessica Bulman-Pozen, 
From Sovereignty and Process to Administration and Politics: The Afterlife of American Feder-
alism, 123 YALE L.J. 1920, 1938 (2014); Richard L. Hasen, Essay: Political Dysfunction and Con-
stitutional Change, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 989, 993 (2013). 
 The development also transpired in the years immediately following a series of Supreme Court 
decisions striking down statutes designed to give Congress a formal role in the appointment or 
removal of executive branch officials. See Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abate-
ment of Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S. 252 (1991), Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Congress also cannot draft statutory requirements that overly constrain 
the President’s choice set for appointments. See Hechinger v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 36 
F.3d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1994); supra Section I.A. 
74. See Josh Chafetz, The Phenomenology of Gridlock, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2065, 
2067 (2013) (labeling as conventional wisdom the view that “Congress is hopelessly gridlocked”). 
75. For a recent treatment of congressional dysfunction, see THOMAS MANN & NORMAN 
J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYS-
TEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM (2012). 
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years, Congress has passed far fewer laws than a generation ago.76 Existing 
laws often delegate significant authority to the executive branch,77 and con-
gressional committees sometimes overlook their oversight function.78 To-
day, Congress even struggles with more routine tasks, like passing budgets 
prior to the start of a new fiscal year and approving increases in the debt 
ceiling.79 Facing a reduced role in policymaking, legislators naturally seek al-
ternative means of influence. 
At the same time, presidential innovations such as regulatory review 
by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) and the use 
of White House policy “czars” or councils to coordinate policy among 
agencies have strengthened the President’s hand in administration.80 With 
the door closing on Congress’s more direct levers of power and White 
House power over agencies on the ascent, legislators may be turning to 
appointments to indirectly influence policy outcomes.81 
Lawmakers’ increasingly turned their attention to appointments in 
the late 1970s. The Senate strengthened its financial disclosure require-
ments for nominees, increased the amount of time its committees spent 
holding hearings on nominees, and demonstrated a greater willingness to 
place holds on nominees to gain concessions elsewhere from the White 
House.82 By the mid-1990s, Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole (R-KS) reg-
                                                                                                                                             
76. See Michael J. Teter, Gridlock, Legislative Supremacy, and the Problem of Arbitrary 
Inaction, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2065, 2220-21 (2013). 
77. See Kathryn A. Watts, Rulemaking as Legislating, 103 GEO. L.J. 1003, 1013-15 (2015) 
(describing Congress’s delegation of legislative power to agencies). 
78. See Brian D. Feinstein, Congress in the Administrative State, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1189, 1216-20 (2018) (showing that where committee, chamber and agency preferences are misa-
ligned, oversight hearings are less likely to be held); Brian D. Feinstein, Avoiding Oversight: Leg-
islator Preferences and Congressional Monitoring of the Administrative State, 8 J.L. ECON & 
POL’Y 23 (2011) (demonstrating that legislators tend to disfavor assignments to oversight-focused 
committees); Terry M. Moe, The Presidency and the Bureaucracy: The Presidential Advantage, 
in THE PRESIDENCY AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 425, 442 (Michael Nelson ed., 2003) (arguing 
that reelection-oriented legislators have scant incentive to participate in oversight activities). 
79. See Jack M. Balkin, The Last Days of Disco: Why the American Political System is 
Dysfunctional, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1159, 1193 (2014). 
80. See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 
125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1176-78 (2012) (discussing White House policy councils); Elana Kagan, 
Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2277-81, 2285-90 (2001) (describing the 
bolstering of OIRA’s influence in regulatory review during the 1980s). 
81. See Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polariza-
tion and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 487 (2008) (observing that 
“[p]olitical polarization has shifted the focus of government policymaking away from Congress 
and to government agencies,” thus raising the stakes for executive appointments). As we discuss 
in this Section, we think other factors have influenced the increasing emphasis that legislators 
place on appointments. 
82. See Ho, supra note 41, at 28 (citing Senate studies on the appointments process from 





ularly sent to President Bill Clinton the names of recommended appoin-
tees to Republican-designated seats on commissions with partisan-balance 
requirements, thus capturing first-mover advantage for this subset of ap-
pointments.83 
The Senate’s heightened attention to nominees expanded the 
timeframe for appointments. Whereas the Senate took an average of 59 
days to confirm judicial and executive branch nominees during the Reagan 
Administration, that figure rose to 127 days during the Obama Admin-
istration.84 Evidence from the Trump Administration suggests the problem 
is getting worse—reports of unusually long delays in confirmations 
abound.85 Although seemingly in tension with lawmakers’ tendency to 
place their own people in the some of these roles, these staffing delays also 
support the inference that senators are scrutinizing appointments more, 
which is consistent with a desire to play a greater role in this realm. 
As one would expect given the stakes, lawmakers’ turn towards ap-
pointments did not occur in a vacuum. The White House may have been 
aware of the implications of Congress’s growing focus on appointments, 
but any measures to counteract it would be costly in several ways. 
While we cannot definitively say whether the White House or Senate 
has greater power over appointments in general—empirical research on 
this question does not yield a firm conclusion86—the Senate has a veto 
power on administrative appointments as a practical matter.87 Should the 
                                                                                                                                             
83. See Feinstein & Hemel, supra note 39, at 63-64 (2018). The historical record is un-
clear as to whether this practice began with Senator Dole. 
84. Anne Joseph O’Connell, Shortening Agency and Judicial Vacancies Through Fili-
buster Reform? An Examination of Confirmation Rates and Delays from 1981 to 2014, 64 DUKE 
L.J. 1645, 1669 (2015). Figures refer to the time to confirmation for confirmed nominees only. Id. 
The Obama Administration figure is calculated through 2014. Id. Rates of failed nominations were 
also higher during the George W. Bush and Obama Administrations than during presidencies 
earlier in the observed period. Id. at 1652. 
85. See Anne Joseph O’Connell, After One Year in Office, Trump’s Behind on Staffing 
but Making Steady Progress, BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 23, 2018) https://www.brookings.edu/re-
search/after-one-year-in-office-trumps-behind-on-staffing-but-making-steady-progress/ 
[https://perma.cc/D6NK-GTBZ]. 
86. See Kelly H. Chang, The President Versus the Senate: Appointments in the Ameri-
can System of Separated Powers and the Federal Reserve, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 319, 343 (2001) 
(finding that “sometimes the [P]resident, sometimes the Senate, and sometimes neither” influ-
ences appointments to the Federal Reserve); David C. Nixon, Separation of Powers and Appoin-
tee Ideology, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 438, 439 (2004) (finding that “[a]ppointee ideology is system-
atically related to the policy preferences and bargaining positions of [both] presidents and sena-
tors”). 
87. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Transcending 
Formalism and Functionalism in Separation-of-Powers Analysis: Reframing the Appointments 
Power After Noel Canning, 64 DUKE L.J. 1513, 1524 (2015)  (arguing that given the “lack of any 
temporal limits on the Senate’s consideration of presidential nominations that require the Senate’s 
approval . . . the Framers intended to give the Senate an unreviewable veto power over presiden-
tial nominations through the expedient of simply not voting on a pending nomination”). 
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Senate reject or fail to act on a presidential nominee, the White House’s 
options are limited. The Recess Appointments Clause authorizes the Pres-
ident to unilaterally appoint officials “during the Recess of the Senate,” 
but these appointments expire at the conclusion of the Senate’s next ses-
sion.88 Thus, by not going into recess and instead holding pro forma ses-
sions, the Senate may prevent the President from exercising this power.89 
Further, the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, which provides a 
framework for the unilateral appointment of “acting” officials to serve on 
a temporary basis, does not apply to multimember commissions.90 Indeed, 
nominations to independent commissions are substantially more likely to 
run aground in the Senate than are nominations to other executive posi-
tions, which suggests that the Senate exerts greater power over independ-
ent commissions than other executive offices.91 
While the House plays no constitutional role in appointments,92 its 
role in lawmaking, budgeting, and oversight may provide its members with 
leverage over appointments. Should House majorities favor a particular 
individual for an executive position, they have chits they can call in. The 
bottom line is that if the President wants agencies staffed to implement his 
or her policies, legislators have several sources of power that they can ex-
ert. 
Indeed, the political branches’ appointments machinations over the 
past several decades sometimes resemble a “Spy Versus Spy” panel: indi-
vidual senators, with the tacit approval of Senate leadership, use holds to 
delay or block consideration of nominees;93 the President then turns to re-
cess appointments to bypass the Senate;94 and the Senate responds by not 
adjourning, technically avoiding a recess by holding one-minute sessions 
every three business days.95 
                                                                                                                                             
88. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3. 
89. See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2574 (2014) (stating 
that Article II “gives the Senate wide latitude to determine whether and when to have a session”). 
Krotoszynski, supra note 87, at 1537-38. 
90. 5 U.S.C. § 3349c(1); see O’Connell, supra note 84, at 1699 n.171. 
91. See O’Connell, supra note 84, at 1661-62. 
92. But see U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 5, cl. 4 (requiring House consent to any Senate recess 
longer than three days, which under certain circumstances could compel the Senate to act on a 
presidential nominee rather than punt to the President to make a recess appointment). 
93. See Nicholas O. Howard & Jason M. Roberts, The Politics of Obstruction: Republi-
can Holds in the U.S. Senate, 40 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 273, 278-81 (2015). 
94. See Ryan C. Black et al., Assessing Congressional Responses to Growing Presiden-
tial Powers: The Case of Recess Appointments, 41 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 570, 582-83 (2011) 
(reporting that Sen. John Cornyn offered this rationale for President George W. Bush’s increased 
use of recess appointments). 
95. See Jordain Carney, Senate Blocks Trump from Making Recess Appointments over 






But even with both branches engaged in an arms’ race regarding ap-
pointments,96 lawmakers in some respects have come out ahead, denying 
the President the ability to fill key positions in high-profile confirmation 
fights.97  Legislators are winning more of these battles today than in the 
past, with Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama experiencing 
higher rates of failed nominations than did Presidents Ronald Reagan, 
George H.W. Bush, or Bill Clinton.98 In sum, as the balance of power be-
tween Congress and the President shifted towards the latter in some areas, 
lawmakers responded by asserting their power in appointments, an area 
less amenable to a presidential counterpunch. 
2. The Advantages of Staffers 
If members of Congress have tried to counter the rise of presidential 
power in administration by putting favored personnel at the helm of inde-
pendent commissions, another question presents itself: Why would they fo-
cus on Hill staffers specifically? After all, if legislators wanted to increase 
their power over policy, they could choose other members of the political 
class with similar ideological commitments.99 
Staffers offer three advantages for members of Congress above what 
other potential appointees outside the Hill, including political allies, can 
deliver. First, lawmakers can gauge their ideological commitments through 
frequent, in-person interaction.100 Second, staffers-turned-commissioners 
may be more pliable to congressional demands because they believe that 
they “owe” their patron in Congress for both their commission seat and 
their previous position on the Hill, whereas for other commissioners, leg-
islators hold only one favor in the bank. Third, staffers operate in an insti-
tution where loyalty to one’s political principal and party is emphasized.101 
                                                                                                                                             
96. See Devins & Lewis, supra note 81, at 488 (discussing the “transform[ation of] the 
nomination and confirmation of independent-agency heads,” with “White House vetting . . . and 
the Senate’s corresponding power to confirm . . . becom[ing] especially consequential”). Cf. Cyn-
thia R. Farina, Undoing the New Deal Through the New Presidentialism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 227, 235 (1998) (asserting that greater presidential involvement in administration, “[b]y 
raising the stakes for other actors in the system . . . may trigger an oversight arms race”). 
97. See, e.g., Ho, supra note 41, at 28. 
98. See O’Connell, supra note 84, at 1660-61. 
99. See Feinstein & Hemel, supra note 39, at 26 (discussing partisan polarization among 
the elite circles from which appointees to independent agencies are drawn). 
100. See Sara L. Hagedorn, Taking the Lead: Congressional Staffers and Their Role in 
the Policy Process 144 (2015) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado), 
https://scholar.colorado.edu/concern/graduate_thesis_or_dissertations/4t64gn319 
[https://perma.cc/HT7Z-8SRZ] (showing that staffers tend to hold the same ideological outlooks 
as their bosses). 
101. See Jacob M. Montgomery & Brendan Nyhan, The Effects of Congressional Staff 
Networks in the U.S. House of Representatives, 79 J. POL. 745, 745 (2017) (asserting that staffers 
are “increasingly loyal to parties rather than members”); Robert Salisbury & Kenneth Shepsle, 
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Placing these individuals—loyal to their legislative principals and incul-
cated in the folkways of Congress—in high-ranking executive offices may 
constitute a significant means of influencing administration. Further, as we 
explain in Section III.B, the growth of this Congress-to-agency channel has 
in fact changed the culture of these agencies—and perhaps ultimately af-
fected their policy outcomes. 
In light of Congress’s growing dysfunction concerning lawmaking and 
other core tasks, how could its members find increasing success in placing 
Hill staffers onto commissions?102 For one, shepherding a nominee through 
Congress may attract less attention and require fewer resources than pass-
ing a law: no turf wars among committees for jurisdiction, no omnibus bun-
dles, no amendment tree gamesmanship on the floor, no prospect of con-
voluted conference committee negotiations with the House, and so on. In-
stead, the relevant Senate committee and the floor ultimately are faced 
with a simple question: “Will the Senate advise and consent to this nomi-
nation?”103 Further, in contrast to the time and resource costs necessary to 
place a new issue on Congress’s agenda—for example, lobbying one’s col-
leagues and holding hearings to gin up interest—the Constitution places 
the agenda-setting function for appointments squarely with the Presi-
dent;104 no congressional effort is required.105 Given these advantages, it 
makes sense that members of a resource-constrained and increasingly dys-
functional institution would focus on appointments. 
The rise of Hill staffers may also be an elegant solution to another 
problem: the need for potential appointees to credibly signal their ideolog-
ical bona fides. We turn to this next. 
                                                                                                                                             
Congressional Staff Turnover and the Ties-That-Bind, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 381, 394 (1981) (as-
serting that staffers are loyal to the legislator who hired them and supervises them). 
102. We do not intend to suggest that the Senate’s role in appointments is insusceptible 
to the dysfunction pervading other congressional functions. Indeed, delays in staffing appointed 
positions across the executive branch have increased in recent decades. See Anne Joseph O’Con-
nell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 913, 953-54 
(2009). 
103. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE r. XXXI(1), S. DOC. NO. 113-18 (2013), 
https://www.rules.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/CDOC-113sdoc18.pdf [https://perma.cc/JHZ3-
VWKL]. 
104. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing that the President “by and with the Advice 
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . .  Officers of the United States,” except for certain 
proscribed positions). 
105. Indeed, Congress does not even need to incur search costs to determine whether a 
vacancy exists, as the Vacancies Act requires the heads of agencies to report this information to 





3. The Rise of Programmatic Parties  
The ascent of “programmatic” political parties also encourages the 
appointment of staffers-turned-commissioners.106 A generation or two ago, 
congressional elections were mostly local affairs, emphasizing patronage, 
pork-barrel projects, and the individual candidate’s “home style,” or rep-
utation and persona in the district.107 Today, by contrast, national political 
issues—on which the two parties typically take clear, unified, and distinct 
positions—dominate both campaigns and governance.108 In Professor 
James Q. Wilson’s formulation, party membership has moved from a focus 
on solidary and material incentives to an emphasis on purposive ones, 
namely, advancing an ideological vision and associated programmatic 
goals.109 
It is easy to see how these changes could lead the political branches 
to emphasize ideological purity when considering potential appointees. 
Professor Nancy Scherer describes how this transformation played out in 
the context of the appointment of lower federal judges: 
 
Under both the old and modern party systems, party activists closely mon-
itored the selection of lower court judges. But while local party activists un-
der the old party system viewed lower court judgeships as jobs to be distrib-
uted to friends and campaign contributors, in the modern political era, party 
and issue activists view judicial appointments as crucial policy matters.110 
 
Replace “lower court judges” with “commissioners of independent 
agencies,” and the argument resembles the one we are making. The rise of 
party and issue activists, the donor class, and party-affiliated media alters 
the incentives of political actors in making appointments, encouraging the 
elevation of individuals who have demonstrated fidelity to shared objec-
tives. Former congressional staffers’ tenures on the Hill—spending long 
hours advancing their principal’s policy goals for relatively low pay111—
                                                                                                                                             
106. See MARTIN SHEFTER, POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE STATE: THE AMERICAN HIS-
TORICAL EXPERIENCE 3 (1993). 
107. See RICHARD FENNO, HOME STYLE: HOUSE MEMBERS IN THEIR DISTRICTS 
(1973). 
108. See generally RICHARD FENNO, CONGRESS AT THE GRASSROOTS (1998) (con-
trasting the old and new emphases in congressional campaigns). 
109. See JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS (1995). While the reasons for 
these changes lie beyond this Article’s scope, they include a gradual partisan realignment that 
sorted activists and politicians into two internally cohesive, polarized parties; donors’ and primary 
voters’ growing importance in elections; and news media with a more national scope. See Paul 
Frymer, Debating the Causes of Party Polarization in America, 99 CAL. L. REV. 335 (2011). 
110. NANCY SCHERER, SCORING POINTS: POLITICIANS, ACTIVISTS, AND THE LOWER 
FEDERAL COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS 13 (2005). 
111. See infra Part II.B. 
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send a costly signal that they will remain committed to these goals once 
installed for a fixed term on a commission. That signal is particularly im-
portant when—as now—the parties and their affiliated activists, donors, 
and media place great value on advancing policy goals. 
Recent battles about net neutrality are illustrative. In 2015, the FCC, 
headed by Obama appointee Tom Wheeler, commanding a 3-2 majority 
for Democrats, promulgated “net neutrality” rules reclassifying internet 
services as telecommunications services, thus bringing them under Title II 
of the Communications Act of 1934.112 Three years later, FCC Chair Ajit 
Pai issued new rules undoing the old ones.113 Pai’s nomination to be Chair, 
a position with unusual authority among independent commissions, was in 
effect a referendum on whether to keep net neutrality. As a consequence, 
Pai found himself at the center of something that could only be described 
as a high-profile, mass political campaign. During the rulemaking, the FCC 
received millions of comments on its website, many of which were dupli-
cative and thus highly suggestive of an organized effort.114 Democrats 
made reinstatement of the Obama-era rules a campaign issue,115 and Pai 
witnessed protests at his home and even death threats.116  Pai, a former Hill 
staffer, ultimately delivered for the Trump Administration, which wanted 
to roll back these rules.117 
Several features of this anecdote are noteworthy. First, that federal 
policy regarding regulation of the internet was being made by the FCC 
through the interpretation of a nearly century-old statute, rather than by 
Congress, captures the decline in Congress’s direct role in policymaking, 
as discussed in Section II.A.1. Second, the policy issue garnered wide-
spread public attention, with a clear partisan split between supporters and 
opponents. Third, the instrument for delivering a policy change for the 
Trump Administration was a former Hill staffer, who is viewed by both 
sides as an ideological purist. Finally, the example illustrates how Congress 
can install its personnel onto commissions without necessarily triggering 
                                                                                                                                             
112. See Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601 (2015). 
113. See Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. 311 (2018). 
114. See Paul Hitlin, Kenneth Olmstead & Skye Toor, Public Comments to the Federal 
Communications Commission About Net Neutrality Contain Many Inaccuracies and Duplicates, 
PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2017/11/29/public-com-
ments-to-the-federal-communications-commission-about-net-neutrality-contain-many-inaccura-
cies-and-duplicates/ [https://perma.cc/XK5S-8AK3]. 
115. See Harper Neidig, Can Net Neutrality Be a Potent Political Issue for Democrats?, 
THE HILL (Dec. 24, 2017), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/366177-can-net-neutrality-be-a-
potent-political-issue-for-democrats [https://perma.cc/WQW2-HDAM]. 
116. See Cecilia Kang, Man Charged with Threatening To Kill Ajit Pai’s Family, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/29/technology/ajit-pai-death-threat.html 
[https://perma.cc/8P3K-WFCU]. 





pushback from the White House. Where the same party controls the White 
House and Senate, as was the case at the time of Pai’s appointment, parti-
sans in both branches benefit from the appointment of former Hill staffers 
who are able to credibly signal their ideological bona fides. 
4. Inter-Agency Variation 
The story we have told so far is incomplete; Congress’s demand for 
staffers-turned-commissioners is not uniform across agencies. Table 3, be-
low, reproduces the same three regression models reported in Table 2. 
Whereas Table 2 did not report the agency-level fixed effects, Table 3 does. 
 
Table 3: Staffers-Turned-Commissioners Over Time & Across Agencies 
 




Year Cubed  0.0001* 
(0.00005) 
 
1914-1930   1.436 
(0.904) 
1931-1972   0.166 
(0.827) 









































































Unit of analysis: appointments and reappointments to eleven boards and 
commissions. Dependent variable: whether appointee previously worked 
for or served in Congress. Model: logistic regression (all models); Model 2 
contains a third-degree polynomial transformation of Year (Year & Year2 
terms included in model, but unreported in table); Model 3 employs 
regression splines at 1914-1930, 1931-1972, and 1973-2018. Agency 
covariates modeled as fixed effects; baseline category: the Federal Reserve. 
Period: 1980-2018 (Model 1); 1914-2018 (Model 2); 1914-2018 (Model 3). 
Observations: 459 (Model 1); 977 (Model 2); 977 (Model 3). Pseudo-R2: 
0.142 (Model 1); 0.118 (Model 2); 0.111 (Model 3). *** signifies p < 0.001, 





The various agency fixed effects reported in Table 3 complicate the 
narrative. Compared to the Federal Reserve—which is the baseline cate-
gory and the included agency with historically the smallest proportion of 
former Hill staffers among its leaders—several agencies have a signifi-
cantly greater likelihood of including former Hill staffers among their lead-
ership, controlling for time and the presence of divided government. 
Namely, the positive coefficient estimates achieve conventionally accepted 
levels of statistical significance in at least one model for the CPSC, FCC, 
FEC, FERC, FTC, NLRB, and NRC. Controlling for the time trend and 
effect of divided government, the Hill-to-agency current is particularly 
strong for these agencies. 
What accounts for these differences across agencies? One possibility 
is that the observed variation in appointments is the result of a self-rein-
forcing process. Imagine the following scenario. For idiosyncratic reasons, 
a Hill staffer is appointed to a commission for the first time. Adaptive ex-
pectations then set in;118 the next time a seat on that commission is open, 
political actors fail to agree on a candidate, decide that the first staffer-
turned-commissioner is working out well enough, and so appoint a second 
one. The process then repeats. At the same time, with each subsequent 
appointment, staffers-turned-commissioners’ patrons in Congress gain 
knowledge of how to successfully elevate someone to a commissionership. 
These learning effects give them an advantage in placing their favored can-
didates on commissions in the future.119 The result: a positive feedback 
loop develops, with the boost in staffers-turned-commissioners attributa-
ble to path-dependent development rather than conscious choice to ele-
vate Hill staffers. 
Although this path-dependence theory cannot be empirically evalu-
ated, there is much to recommend it. Not only can it explain the variation 
in staffers-turned-commissioners across agencies, but it also offers a ra-
tionale for why the other theories yield null results. It very well may be 
efficient for political actors to take into account, for example, the commis-
sion’s ideology or the political climate at the time, when deciding whether 
to appoint a congressional staffer. But positive feedback processes are 
rarely path-efficient and often lead to one of multiple possible equilibria.120 
Alternative explanations for these differences across agencies focus 
on idiosyncratic characteristics of each particular commission, or of the 
overall political climate at the time of particular appointments. Empirical 
tests of four of these alternative explanations yield null results. 
                                                                                                                                             
118. See PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME 24 (2004) (defining adaptive expectations). 
119. See id. (“Projections about future aggregate use patterns lead individuals to adapt 
their actions in ways that help to make those expectations come true.”). 
120. See id. at 18, 44. 
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First, we examine whether agencies’ political orientations offer an ex-
planation. We operationalize political orientation using liberal-to-con-
servative ideological scores developed by Professors Joshua Clinton and 
David Lewis.121 As a first cut, we regress the proportion of each agency’s 
commissioners during the 2005-2018 period that were former Hill staffers 
on the agency’s ideological score.122 Figure 4 displays the results. Although 
the regression line in Figure 4 shows a slight negative relationship between 
an agency’s conservativism and the proportion of its commissioners that 
hail from Capitol Hill, the associated confidence intervals are far too wide 
to support a clear connection. 
                                                                                                                                             
121. Clinton and Lewis’s measure is based on a survey of journalists, think-tankers, and 
bureaucracy experts conducted in 2006. See Joshua D. Clinton & David E. Lewis, Expert Opinion, 
Agency Characteristics, and Agency Preferences, 16 POL. ANALYSIS 3, 5 (2008). Because Clinton 
and Lewis’s survey does not include the Fed or FERC, these agencies are excluded from this anal-
ysis. 
122. We use a logit model with standard errors clustered by agency. As an alternative 
specification, we also use a two-limit tobit model censored at 0 and 1. Both models yield substan-
tially similar results. We start at 2005 based on the dramatic increase in staffers-turned-commis-




Figure 4: Agency Ideology & Presence of  
Staffers-Turned-Commissioners 
 
Second, we examine whether staffers-turned-commissioners are more 
common on lower-profile commissions. If lawmakers view appointments 
as patronage plums to reward longtime staffers, one might expect the phe-
nomenon to be concentrated in lower-salience, less consequential agen-
cies. After all, getting one’s employee a sinecure on an obscure commission 
may incur fewer political costs than installing that individual on a commis-
sion such as the FCC. 
Third, in another variation of the patronage story, we consider 
whether staffers-turned-commissions are concentrated on agencies that 
address relatively less-sophisticated subjects. By analogy, consider the 
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practice of presidents appointing their campaign supporters to cushy am-
bassadorships in European capitals, while reserving positions in countries 
with more complex relationships with the U.S. to expert career diplo-
mats.123 If a similar dynamic is at play in the administrative state, we would 
expect the presence of staffers-turned-commissioners to be negatively cor-
related with the complexity of an agency’s subject matter. 
Finally, we examine whether a possible association between an 
agency’s ideology and the presence of former Hill staffers depends on pe-
riod-specific political dynamics. 
Regression models testing all of these hypotheses yield null results.124 
We cannot reject the null hypotheses that any of these alternative expla-
nations—major features of the overall political climate at the time of ap-
pointment, whether the commission is high- or low-profile, or whether it 
addresses complex subject matter—have no connection to the likelihood 
that a former Hill staffer is appointed to a given commission. 
 
* * * 
 
                                                                                                                                             
123. See Dav Seminara, In U.S., Selling Ambassadorships To Highest Bidder Has Long 
History, WASH. DIPLOMAT (Feb. 28, 2013), https://washdiplomat.com/index.php?op-
tion=com_content&id=8985:in-us-selling-ambassadorships-to-highest-bidder-has-long-his-
tory&Itemid=428 [https://perma.cc/3WXH-WC6A]. 
124. To test the political-climate account, we regress whether each individual hails from 
Capitol Hill on various features of the political climate at the time of the appointment. To capture 
any period-specific political influences on appointments, we include year-level fixed effects. Al-
ternative specifications replace these year-level fixed effects with (i) fixed effects for each Presi-
dent-Senate Majority Leader pair; (ii) fixed effects for each pair of the President and Senate leader 
of the other party than the President; and (iii) dummy variables for a Republican President, GOP 
Senate majority, and the interaction of the two. Each model employs logistic regression with 
agency-clustered standard errors. All models also include the relevant agency’s Clinton-Lewis ide-
ological score as an independent variable.  The analysis encompasses the period 2005 to 2018. 
 To test the lower-profile-commissions account, for each commissioner appointed after 2004, 
we regress whether that commissioner formerly worked for Congress on a measure capturing the 
relevant agency’s public profile. We operationalize “public profile” as the number of times the 
agency was mentioned in the New York Times in the year of the appointment. As above, we esti-
mate several alternative specifications with different variables capturing period-specific political 
dynamics. The model is a logistic regression with agency-clustered standard errors. 
To test the less-sophisticated-commissions account, for each commissioner appointed during the 
period of study, we regress whether that individual previously worked in Congress on two 
measures of regulatory complexity: the number of regulatory restrictions issued by the agency in 
the previous year and, in an alternative model, the total word length of those regulations. The data 
for these two measures were obtained from Patrick A. McLaughlin & Oliver Sherouse, RegData 
U.S. 3.2 Agency Summary Dataset, QUANTGOV, https://www.quantgov.org/bulk-download. We 
estimate similar alternative specifications as before to capture period-specific fixed-effects.  All 
models employ logistic regression with agency-clustered standard errors.  Because the data source 
used here ends in 2017, this analysis covers 2005-2017 rather than 2005-2018 in the previous mod-
els. Contra our prediction, the coefficient estimates are positive in all eight of the models that we 
estimate. All eight, however, fall short of statistical significance. (p=0.13 in one model, p=0.14 in 




In this section, we examined the demand-side of the market for com-
missioners, focusing on lawmakers’ incentives to place former congres-
sional staffers in these positions. We argued that the demand for staffers 
as commissioners has recently increased because of the relative fall in con-
gressional power over policy. As one pathway of power has been weak-
ened, legislators naturally have resorted to alternative, lower-cost means 
of influencing policy. On the other side of the equation, although the White 
House decides whom to nominate for these positions, it may have less rel-
ative power than is apparent, since the Senate can act as a veto gate over 
the White House’s ability to execute its policy choices through appointees. 
At the same time, increasingly cohesive and ideologically oriented parties 
arguably favor appointing ideological true believers to commissions; in this 
climate, Hill staffers’ demonstrated commitment to their party’s policy 
goals makes them particularly well-suited as appointees. 
B. Supply-Side 
Continuing with our market metaphor, we next consider whether a 
demand-focused account may be only half of the story. Changing work-
place dynamics on Capitol Hill also may have influenced the supply of in-
dividuals seeking to work as commissioners on independent agencies. 
Namely, it is possible that growing congressional dysfunction may have in-
duced senior staffers to head to the exits in increasing numbers. A 1995 
Congressional Management Foundation report described employment in 
Congress in dismal terms: “Staff typically work exceedingly long, unpre-
dictable hours that leave little time for outside activities; receive lower pay 
than both private sector and federal executive branch staff; work in 
cramped quarters with no privacy; exercise minimal control over their 
work schedules; and have virtually no job security.”125 
The situation has only worsened since then. Between 2009 and 2013, 
inflation-adjusted salaries declined by twenty percent for House counsels 
and thirteen percent for House legislative directors.126 In the Senate, coun-
sel and legislative directors saw similar decreases in salary.127 Further, staff-
ing levels for policy positions have been in decline for decades; whereas in 
1979 committees in both chambers employed a total of 3,437 staffers, by 
                                                                                                                                             
125. Nicole Cooper, Working in Congress: Introduction, CONG. MGMT. FOUND. (Feb. 3, 
2007), https://www.congressfoundation.org/index.php?option=com_con-
tent&task=view&id=117&Itemid=50 [https://perma.cc/55LJ-A9K6]. 
126. See Lee Drutman et. al, Congress Must Invest in Its Own Capacity Again, R STREET 
INST. (Mar. 9, 2016), https://www.rstreet.org/2016/03/09/congress-must-invest-in-its-own-capacity-
again/ [https://perma.cc/P4B7-WD3E]. 
127. See id. (reporting that salaries for individuals holding these positions in the Senate 
declined fourteen percent and eleven percent, respectively, over this period). 
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2012, that figure had fallen to 2,262 individuals128—presumably limiting op-
portunities for advancement in a shrinking workforce. And while staffing 
levels and salaries declined, the work may have become more difficult; the 
size and scope of the executive branch that these committee staffers are 
charged with overseeing more than doubled in real terms between 1979 
and 2012.129 These developments may make working for Congress a less-
attractive career option—and increase the attractiveness of exit. 
To be clear, we do not claim that the typical high-level Hill staffer 
would prefer to be an SEC Commissioner because of a growing pay or 
work-quality gap between Congress and the SEC. Plainly, a seat on a high-
profile commission is likely to be a more attractive career option than serv-
ing as a top aide to a powerful senator or committee in any era. But what 
about a position on a less consequential commission? When Congress was 
well-functioning and the employment structure facilitated spending one’s 
career on Capitol Hill,130 a star staffer for an influential lawmaker conceiv-
ably might prefer to stay put rather than accept a fixed-term appointment 
to a minority-party seat on a backwater commission. If exit decisions are 
made at the margins, then we would expect to see more departures among 
policy-motivated staffers as Congress’s policymaking capacity and its at-
tractiveness as a workplace both have waned. 
Compounding matters, service on a commission simultaneously has 
become less financially attractive for high-fliers in the private sector. Over 
the past generation, the income gains for the most highly paid individuals, 
virtually all of whom presumably work outside of government, have far 
outpaced those of other workers.131 Members of one common group from 
                                                                                                                                             
128. Vital Statistics on Congress, supra note 70, at 1 tbl. 5-1. 
129. See Historical Tables, OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET 28, tbl.  1.3, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/historical-tables/ [https://perma.cc/F5KH-9ZEN]. 
130. See Sarah Binder, The Dysfunctional Congress, 18 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 85, 91-92 
(2015) (identifying the mid-1960s through 1970s as the post-war period in which Congress’s 
agenda was most expansive); Kenneth A. Shepsle, The Changing Textbook Congress, in CAN THE 
GOVERNMENT GOVERN? 239 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989) (describing “an 
institutional bargain that gave prominence to committees and the jurisdictional imperative” of the 
Congresses of the mid-twentieth century). 
131. See Chad Stone et al., A Guide to Statistics on Historical Trends in Income Inequal-
ity, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 9-10 (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/de-
fault/files/atoms/files/11-28-11pov_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/JP76-BCPT]. The pay gap between pri-
vate- and public-sector workers also has grown. See Comparing the Compensation of Federal and 
Private-Sector Employees, 2011 to 2015, CONG. BUDGET OFF. 10, 15 (Apr. 2017), 
https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/115th-congress-2017-2018/reports/52637-federalprivatepay.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZH44-NM6K] (finding that the total compensation was lower for federal em-






which commissioners are selected, law firm partners, have seen their in-
comes rise precipitously.132 Almost twenty years ago, Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist recognized that the increase in opportunity costs for public ser-
vice could discourage “many of the very best lawyers” from judicial ser-
vice.133 
A similar dynamic may be playing out among the pool of potential 
executive appointees. Consider the pre-appointment professional lives of 
two FTC commissioners: Chair Joseph Simons and Rebecca Slaughter. 
Slaughter arrived at the FTC after serving as chief counsel to Senator 
Charles Schumer,134 a position that would have paid no more than $111,000 
in 2013.135 Simons, by contrast, came to the FTC from the partnership of 
Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, where his most recent partner-
ship share was $1.9 million.136 While income gaps between big-firm part-
ners and federal officials are nothing new, the size of Simons’s pay cut may 
make others in a similar position think twice about the opportunity cost of 
government service. Taken together, the decline in pay for high-level staff-
ers and the massive increase in pay for high-level attorneys could shift the 
supply of potential commissioners away from the private sector and to the 
halls of Congress. 
Digging deeper, we ask whether a concomitant decline in appoint-
ments from the private sector has accompanied the rise of staffers-turned-
commissioners. To answer this question, we examine changes over the 
1934-2018 period in the proportion of newly appointed SEC commission-
ers’ with certain pre-appointment employment. Specifically, we examine 
whether each new commissioner arrived at the SEC immediately from one 
of the following positions: (a) congressional staff or member; (b) SEC staff; 
(c) other executive branch position; and (d) securities-related private-sec-
                                                                                                                                             
132. See Albert Yoon, Love’s Labor Lost? Judicial Tenure Among Federal Court 
Judges: 1945-2000, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1029, 1038 (2003) (finding greater increases in the salaries of 
law firm partners than those of most professions, including federal judges). 
133. William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Statement Before the 
National Commission on the Public Service (July 15, 2002), https://www.supremecourt.gov/pub-
licinfo/speeches/viewspeech/sp_07-15-02 [https://perma.cc/E945-A3AH]. 
134. See Cecilia Kang, ‘I Don’t Feel Superhuman. I Feel Like a Mom Who Has a Ca-
reer.’, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/31/technology/government-
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135. See R. ERIC PETERSEN, LARA E. CHAUSOW & AMBER HOPE WILHELM, CONG. 
RES. SERV., R43774, STAFF PAY LEVELS FOR SELECTED POSITIONS IN SENATORS’ OFFICES, 
FY2009-FY2013 10, tbl. 6 (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43774.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NBK-
BGCG]. 
136. See Mike Scarcella & C. Ryan Barber, Joseph Simons of Paul Weiss, Trump’s FTC 
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tor work (in practice, securities lawyers). As before, we use Professor Da-
vid Nixon’s biographical dataset for 1934-2000 and collect our own data 
from internet sources for 2001-2018. 
Figure 5 displays our findings. 137 
 
Figure 5: Proportion of New SEC Commissioners by Most Recent  
Work Experience 
Our claim that increased opportunity costs for individuals in the pri-
vate sector to serve in government has shifted the SEC’s compositional 
balance in favor of former Hill staffers does not find support in Figure 5. 
Instead, Figure 5(d) shows that the proportion of commissions hailing from 
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direct and indirect employment by regulated industry, with indirect employment including legal 





the private sector has remained steady for almost sixty years.138 Still, the 
trend towards appointing staffers-turned-commissioners appears to have 
come at the expense of SEC staffers and other executive branch employ-
ees, not private-sector workers. Even though the data concerning the SEC 
does not support the public-private sector pay gap hypothesis, because the 
figure examines a single agency—and an unusually high-profile one at 
that—we are not ready to reject this possible explanation for agencies writ 
large. Whether other commissions exhibit a similar pattern is a promising 
area for future research. 
In addition to the above pay-related dynamics, congressional dysfunc-
tion may make executive appointments less attractive to job candidates 
who are not currently working on the Hill. Consider that the average time 
from nomination to confirmation for all executive and judicial appointees 
has more than doubled from the Reagan to the Obama Administrations.139 
Failed nominations also have crept upward, from eighteen percent of all 
nominations under Reagan to twenty-eight percent under Obama,140 with 
even higher failure rates for appointees to independent commissions.141 
Remaining in limbo for a prolonged period may be particularly disruptive 
to nominees with existing careers outside of politics and those contemplat-
ing a long-distance move to Washington to accept a position. Observing 
the growing proportion of nominees hailing from the District of Columbia 
or an adjacent state, Professor Anne Joseph O’Connell raises the possibil-
ity that the length and unpredictability of the confirmation process “may 
be narrowing the pool of top officials.”142 
But whereas an individual living outside of Washington or working 
outside of politics might view the confirmation process as disruptive to her 
life, congressional staffers do not face these concerns to nearly the same 
degree. Perversely, the delay and uncertainty that Congress has injected 
into the confirmation process may advantage Hill staffers at the expense 
of other potential nominees. 
In summary, several related trends may jointly contribute to an in-
crease in the supply of staffers-turned-commissioners: increasingly long 
hours, low job security, and reduced pay push Hill staffers towards the ex-
its, while simultaneously, the greater share of national income received by 
high-earners encourages law partners and other potential commissioners 
from the private sector to stay put. That public-sector employees and those 
                                                                                                                                             
138. Since our data cannot distinguish between job functions within the private sector, 
however, one must take these findings with a grain of salt. For instance, there still may be a sub-
stitution of higher-prestige law partners in favor of lower-prestige ones. 
139. O’Connell, supra note 84, at 1669. The Obama figure refers to the 2009-2014 period. 
140. Id. at 1660-61. 
141. Id. at 1652. 
142. Id. at 1653. 
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living in the Washington metropolitan area may be better able to bear the 
challenges of increasingly lengthy confirmation processes may also tip the 
balance towards staffers-turned-commissioners. 
An alternative supply-side story also exists. Whereas, in past genera-
tions, an ambitious young policy wonk aiming for a commissionership 
might have begun her career at an agency, law firm, or any number of other 
places, today she may observe the growing staffer-to-commissioner pipe-
line and instead decide to work for Congress. In this telling, the early glim-
merings of a staffer-to-commissioner trend becomes self-reinforcing, with 
path-dependent, herd behavior among prospective commissioners fueling 
the trend. If that is the case, then agencies may be populated with individ-
uals with the same qualities as commissioners prior to the rise of the 
staffer-to-commissioner pipeline, with the only difference being the partic-
ular lines on those individuals’ résumés. 
If one believes this alternative story, then why would one care if mem-
bers of Washington’s striver class punch their tickets by working in Con-
gress or somewhere else? If the same sorts of people are seated at commis-
sion daises in either case, then why does it matter whether they previously 
worked for Congress? Part III addresses this question. As that part shows, 
the experience of working for Congress may have profound consequences 
for one’s professional enculturation. To the extent that staffers-turned-
commissioners import Congress’s norms of behavior onto independent 
commissions, that dynamic may impact the functioning of these commis-
sions. 
III. Consequences 
In this Part, we address the consequences of the increased likelihood 
of commissions being run, in whole or part, by former Hill staffers on the 
functioning and effectiveness of these bodies. The following Section dis-
cusses possible effects of the Congress-to-commission pipeline on commis-
sions’ relationships with other actors. Namely, we suggest that this phe-
nomenon may enable Congress to exert greater influence on independent 
regulatory commissions, bolster congressional support for commissions’ 
activities, and perhaps even enhance commissions’ democratic accounta-
bility. 
Next, we address how the phenomenon may influence agencies’ inter-
nal functioning. Here, we are less sanguine. On one hand, a career on Cap-
itol Hill may provide an education in political tactics and congressional 
culture, which—for better or worse—may be imported to independent reg-
ulatory commissions. On the other hand, greater knowledge of legislative 
intent and legislative history of the laws that their agencies administer may 





A. Extra-Agency  
1. Strengthening Congress’s Role 
The staffers-turned-commissioners phenomenon offers distinct bene-
fits to Congress. As explained in Part II, the timing of this trend suggests 
that Congress intended to place former staffers on commissions as a reac-
tion to other developments that weakened Congress’s relative role in ad-
ministration.143 It is easy to see how Congress’s turn towards appointing its 
former staffers to commissioners could strengthen Congress’s hand. 
Beginning with the Reagan Administration, presidents have known 
that appointing loyalists to administrative agencies can be an effective 
strategy for influencing agency decision-making.144 Whereas, according to 
an American Bar Association (ABA) report, prior presidents “ha[d] been 
loath to let it appear that they were influencing regulatory agencies,”145 
President Reagan emphasized personal loyalty and ideological congruence 
in making appointments.146 This practice has increased in subsequent ad-
ministrations, with presidents aggressively using appointments to encour-
age agencies to march in lockstep with White House priorities.147 
That Congress would subsequently embrace this strategy is unsurpris-
ing. Conventional wisdom holds that independent agencies lie within Con-
gress’s sphere of influence more than the President’s.148 Writing for the 
Court in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Justice Antonin Scalia asserted 
that “independent agencies are sheltered not from politics but from the 
President, and . . . their freedom from [p]residential oversight (and protec-
tion) has simply been replaced by increased subservience to congressional 
                                                                                                                                             
143. See supra Section II.A. 
144. See Kagan, supra note 80, at 2277. 
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146. See Kagan, supra note 80, at 2277. 
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direction.”149 Indeed, appointees and civil servants at independent com-
missions report significantly more congressional influence than do employ-
ees working in executive departments.150 If Congress endeavors to use ap-
pointments to influence administration, independent agencies are a natu-
ral place to start. 
For an individual member of Congress, placing one’s staffer on an in-
dependent commission has obvious advantages.151 But the staffers-turned-
commissioners phenomenon also benefits Congress as an institution in two 
respects. 
First, a survey of congressional staff reveals that most staffers hold a 
“sense of loyalty to the body within which they work,” meaning the Senate 
or House, and a subset develop “a sense of loyalty and commitment to the 
institution of Congress more broadly.”152 Russell Mills and Jennifer Selin’s 
study of detailees—agency personnel temporarily assigned to work for a 
congressional committee—offers insights. Mills and Selin find that detail-
ees “can represent the interests and perspectives of the agency, and give 
the agency a conduit to [congressional] committee decision making.”153 
Perhaps a similar dynamic exists concerning staffers-turned-commission-
ers, who take the opposite path as agency detailees to Congress. 
The degree to which staffers-turned-commissioners exhibit loyalty to 
Congress as an institution may differ by staff function and title. Former 
committee staffers may feel the institution’s pull more than former per-
sonal staffers. Former congressional counsels’ professional training may 
lead them to value adherence to general legal norms, whereas former 
chiefs of staff may harbor a different role-morality. Evaluation of the var-
ious types of congressional staffers that are appointed to commissions is a 
promising area for future research. 
Second, the Congress-centric social network that a staffer-turned-
commissioner developed while working on Capitol Hill may influence her 
behavior as a commissioner. Consider that after the confirmation vote, the 
Senate has limited leverage over appointees—and a host of other actors 
compete for the appointee’s loyalties. The President exerts some degree of 
                                                                                                                                             
149. 556 U.S. 502, 523 (2009). 
150. See Joshua D. Clinton, David E. Lewis, & Jennifer L. Selin, Influencing the Bureau-
cracy: The Irony of Congressional Oversight, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 387, 394 (2014) (reporting survey 
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153. Russell W. Mills & Jennifer L. Selin, Don’t Sweat the Details! Enhancing Congres-





control over independent agencies.154 Narrow, well-organized interest 
groups subject to, or benefitting from, the agency’s regulations may “cap-
ture” appointees’ attention.155 Moreover, after sustained interactions with 
their careerist subordinates, appointees may “go native,” that is accultur-
ate to their agencies, adopting the norms and perspectives of the agency’s 
civil service.156 
An appointee with a deep social or professional network on Capitol 
Hill may be better able to resist these sirens. Observers have noted in other 
contexts how officials’ extracurricular networks influence their profes-
sional activities. For instance, Professor Daniel Carpenter charts how bu-
reaucrats’ outside-the-Beltway professional networks provide them with 
an alternative power base, thereby reducing their reliance on elected offi-
cials.157 Similarly, Supreme Court watchers have identified a so-called 
“Greenhouse effect,” in which Republican-appointed Justices tack left fol-
lowing their immersion in a liberal Washington legal establishment.158 
Like Carpenter’s bureaucrats, staffers-turned-commissioners’ ties 
with current legislators and staffers may provide them with a basis of sup-
port outside of the executive branch, thereby enabling them to act in ways 
in which a commissioner without extra-branch ties could not.159 And to the 
extent that staffers-turned-commissioners maintain ties with their former 
colleagues on the Hill, these social connections may encourage them to 
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support Congress-favored measures in a similar manner as the Green-
house effect influences conservative justices. 
Prior Hill experience may be particularly important as a bulwark 
against going native. According to Professor Bruce Ackerman, when even 
appointees with differing views from their civil servants engage in sus-
tained interactions with these mission-focused civil servants, there is a 
“great danger” that appointees will “succumb to the pressures of the en-
trenched ideologues to sustain the preexisting mission of the agency.”160 
Civil servants do, in fact, frequently have differing views than agency 
heads.161 Further, civil servants may sort into employment based on their 
level of commitment to the agency’s mission.162 The result may be, for ex-
ample, an NLRB staff stocked with labor advocates or a NRC with propo-
nents of nuclear power.163 Accordingly, the political branches may worry 
about the prospect of commissioner assimilation into agency culture 
through sustained interactions with expert civil servants. 
For appointees with deep ties to the White House, sustained interac-
tions with White House officials could provide a partial corrective; while 
administration officials are likely to hold the “correct” ideological outlook, 
they are unlikely to be experts in the agency’s subject matter. Accordingly, 
they are of limited use as a counterweight to the influence of expert civil 
servants in the fight for an appointee’s attention. 
Appointees from Congress face different circumstances. A Republi-
can Hill staffer-turned-NLRB Board Member may maintain ties with ex-
pert Republican staffers on the House Committee on Education and La-
bor. A liberal staffer-turned-NRC Commissioner may stay connected to 
expert Democrats on the Senate Committee on Environment and Public 
Works. In this way, staffers-turned-commissioners may be embedded in 
professional networks that are both ideologically consistent and expert. 
These networks enable them to seek out informed second opinions from 
their ideological allies when they do not fully trust the views of expert-but-
ideologically dissimilar civil servants.164 
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In summary, staffers-turned-commissioners’ earlier socialization in 
Congress may engender loyalty to that institution, with their social and 
professional ties to lawmakers and staff reinforcing that sense of loyalty. 
Placing former staffers onto commissions may be particularly effective as 
a defense against appointees “going native,” because these appointees are 
likely to be connected to lawmakers and staff who are both expert and ide-
ologically similar—a rare combination. By pulling independent commis-
sions closer into Congress’s orbit and guarding against bureaucratic drift, 
the presence of staffers-turned-commissioners helps effectuate congres-
sional intent underlying the creation of at least some independent commis-
sions: to project congressional power into the administrative state.165 
2. Shoring Up Congressional Support 
Staffers-turned-commissioners also may be able to leverage their ties 
to Congress to advance their agencies’ interests. Just as lobbying firms and 
trade associations hire former lawmakers and staffers to capitalize on these 
individuals’ goodwill toward and connections with current legislators,166 so 
too could staffers-turned-commissioners’ social and professional ties to 
members of Congress benefit their new employers. We consider four 
mechanisms by which staffers-turned-commissioners could strengthen the 
ties between their agency and Congress—to their agency’s benefit. 
First, staffers-turned-commissioners are particularly well-positioned 
to advocate before Congress on behalf of their agencies. Commissioners 
routinely testify before congressional committees, making the case for 
their agency’s budget requests.167 Commissioners also urge Congress to 
grant their agencies greater powers or to defend their existing turf.168 For 
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instance, lawmaker-turned-SEC Chair Christopher Cox performed this 
function when he urged his former House colleagues not to substantially 
weaken the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.169 When performing these functions, 
commissioners essentially serve as lobbyists for their commissions.170 Just 
as former Hill staffers are able to leverage their connections in Congress 
on behalf of their private-sector clients, staffers-turned-commissioners 
may be able to do the same on behalf of their commissions.171 
Second, staffers-turned-commissioners could use their knowledge of 
Congress’s internal dynamics to reduce conflicts between the branches. A 
former congressional staffer is well-positioned to advise her agency on 
what potential actions would invoke Congress’s ire and thus should be 
avoided. Once again, Mills and Selin’s work on agency detailees to Con-
gress offers insights. Mills and Selin describe how detailees can assist Con-
gress in predicting how their home agency would interpret a new statute.172 
Similarly, staffers-turned-commissioners can assist agencies in predicting 
how Congress might respond to a potential new rule or enforcement ac-
tion. Further, once an agency finds itself in hot water with lawmakers, staff-
ers-turned-commissioners may be able to use their connections in and un-
derstanding of Congress to cool the temperature and thus avoid embar-
rassing public hearings.173 
Third, due to their connections to Congress, staffers-turned-commis-
sioners may be particularly well-situated to assist their agencies’ lawyers 
and policy experts in providing drafting assistance to lawmakers. The prac-
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tice of agencies assisting Congress with legislative drafting is common-
place.174 To the extent that staffers-turned-commissioners have deeper 
knowledge of the drafting process and stronger ties to current lawmakers 
than do other commissioners, they are better positioned to assist with this 
task—to the potential benefit of their agency.175 
Fourth, the presence of former congressional staffers on the daises of 
independent commissions may encourage future delegations from Con-
gress. Preference divergence between a principal and agent discourages 
the principal from delegating authority to that agent,176 as does the princi-
pal’s uncertainty regarding the agent’s preferences.177 In other words, even 
when Congress believes that the commission’s preferences are aligned with 
its own, Congress’s uncertainty regarding this belief leads to suboptimal 
delegation.178 When the President nominates and the Senate confirms a 
former Hill staffer to an independent commission, however, Congress may 
be more confident in its knowledge of the staffer’s preferences based on 
her longstanding professional relationships with members of Congress. 
Accordingly, Congress may be more comfortable delegating authority to 
that commission in the future. 
3. Increasing Democracy Accountability 
The rise of staffers-turned-commissioners also may mitigate the ad-
ministrative state’s democratic deficit.179 The Senate could channel its new-
found energy concerning appointments into pushing for ideologically 
aligned Beltway lawyers or technocratic internal candidates at the commis-
sions to fill these roles. By choosing instead to select former Hill staffers, 
the Senate may strengthen—albeit imperfectly—independent agencies’ 
democratic accountability and responsiveness.180 
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ideal points but does not know them precisely . . . [T]his reduces the value of delegating, if the 
boss is risk-averse.”). 
178. See id. 
179. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy 
in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 480 (2003) (discussing the origins of the “ma-
joritarian critique of agency decisionmaking”). 
180. To be clear, we are not suggesting that the Senate’s increased role in appointments 
alone has a remedial effect on accountability. Any increase in that chamber’s role necessarily im-
plies a reduction in the President’s power, and we take no position on whether democratic ac-
countability is better served by strengthening one of these institutions over the other. Instead, we 
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To be clear, we are not suggesting that any loyalty that staffers-
turned-commissioners feel to their congressional principal renders com-
missions completely democratically accountable. By way of example, let’s 
return to Richard Roberts, the former staffer to Senator Richard Shelby 
who was later appointed to the SEC. To claim that Roberts’s appointment 
makes the SEC more democratically accountable in this manner requires 
the following herculean assumptions: (1) the public has views on securities 
law; (2) the median senator reflects the public’s views; (3) Senator Shelby 
reflects the median senator’s views; and (4) Roberts reflects Senator 
Shelby’s views. All of these assumptions are open to challenge.181 To the 
extent that commissioners are democratically responsive at all, that is 
mostly because they are nominated by an elected President and confirmed 
by an elected Senate. 
Nonetheless, we wonder whether staffers-turned-commissioners’ ex-
perience in Congress makes them more attuned to—or even more solici-
tous of—the average citizen’s views than a Washington lawyer-turned-
commissioner would be. Lawmakers spend much of their time interacting 
with constituents and evaluating how their actions will be perceived in 
their district.182 High-level staffers, in turn, engage in deep and sustained 
interactions with these lawmakers.183 Lawmakers’ attention to constituent 
or mass public views might therefore rub off on staffers. 
Recall, for instance, that Roberts previously served as Senator 
Shelby’s chief of staff, both when Shelby was a first-term House member 
and later when he became a senator.184 Serving as a high-level staffer to a 
rising politician presumably provided Roberts with exposure to a law-
maker’s re-election imperative—and thus to constituent opinion. The 
same cannot be said for an SEC lifer, a white-shoe lawyer, or any number 
of other professions from which commissioners are selected. 
We do not wish to hang too much on this hook. After all, the inevita-
ble time lag between service as a Hill staffer and service as a commissioner 
                                                                                                                                             
focus on the ways in which the Senate chooses to use its role in appointments—namely by ap-
pointing former employees to independent commissions—and how that enhances commissions’ 
democratic responsiveness. 
181. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Unitary Executive Interpretation: A Comment, 15 
CARDOZO L. REV. 313, 318-19 (1993) (positing that congressional committee chairs tend to be 
“farther from the median of national opinion than are presidents”). 
182. See ROGER H. DAVIDSON ET AL., CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS 113 (14th ed. 
2013). 
183. For instance, a large majority of legislative counsel responding to a survey claimed 
that whether legislative history was drafted by a staffer versus a lawmaker is irrelevant because, 
in the words of one respondent, “[e]verything staff does members approve, and everything mem-
bers say is written by staff.” Abbe Gluck & Lisa Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the In-
side—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. 
L. REV. 901, 983 (2013). 





means that any osmosis of public views that occurred while a staffer is no 
longer current. Still, the possibility that staffers-turned-commissioners in-
sert an added dose of democratic accountability to independent commis-
sions is worth raising. 
B. Intra-Agency 
1. Playing Political Hardball 
Staffers-turned-commissioners also may bring with them deep 
knowledge of “political hardball”—that is, practices that are within the 
bounds of the law, but are in tension with previously longstanding norms 
of behavior—acquired through their prior employment in Congress.185 
Congressional leaders often are viewed as savvy tacticians, able to see sev-
eral moves ahead and use—or, better yet, bend—the rules of the game to 
their advantage.186 If staffers-turned-commissioners learn at the knee of 
these lawmakers, then we might expect them to import several strategies 
to independent commissions. The following three areas are illustrative. 
First, experience on Capitol Hill may provide staffers-turned-com-
missions with greater knowledge of how to advance favored changes and 
delay disfavored ones. Staffers-turned-commissioners’ exposure to the leg-
islative process gives them a front-row seat for the stagecraft involved in 
introducing a proposed new policy, strategic considerations inherent in co-
alition-building, and the use of cheap talk and leverage in negotiations. 
These skills presumably are applicable to policymaking in other multi-
member settings, such as independent commissions. 
Similarly, they may have learned from their time on the Hill tactics to 
delay disfavored policies. Commissioners generally have some ability to 
delay rulemakings, and one might expect a former Hill staffer to be more 
strategic in the use of this tactic.187 One former commissioner we spoke 
                                                                                                                                             
185. We adopt this definition from Mark Tushnet’s definition of constitutional hardball. 
See Mark V. Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 523, 523 (2004); see also 
William Galston, Toughness as a Political Virtue, 17 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 175, 190 (1991) 
(providing an early definition of the term political hardball: “hardball means sliding into the sec-
ond baseman to break up a double play; softball means sliding around [him] . . . to avoid poten-
tially injuring him; dirtyball means sliding into him spikes up with the intention of knocking him 
out of the game.”). 
186. See, e.g., Amber Phillips, Another Big Mitch McConnell Supreme Court Gamble 
Looks Set To Pay Off, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2008, 1:27 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/pol-
itics/2018/10/04/another-big-mitch-mcconnell-supreme-court-gamble-looks-set-pay-off/?noredi-
rect=on&utm_term=.8fa68f3561fc [https://perma.cc/D8XW-M8V4]. 
187. See Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Advising, Consenting, Delaying, and Expediting: 
Senator Influences on Presidential Appointments, 30 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 19, 22 (2016) (ex-
plaining senators’ strategic use of “blue slip objection[s] . . . to delay, not defeat, a [judicial] nom-
ination”). 
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with noted, “a commissioner can easily push hearings off a week or two, 
and given travel schedules and other priorities, sometimes a few-week de-
lay could force a months-long delay in consideration of a rule.”188 
Second, staffers-turned-commissioners—accustomed to switches in 
partisan control that have occurred periodically in both chambers of Con-
gress for the past twenty-five years—may be particularly adept at manag-
ing political transitions. Minority commissioners know “where the bodies 
are buried,” according to another former commissioner we interviewed, 
which enables policy reversals following a switch in partisan control of the 
White House to happen more effectively.189 Their presence enables agen-
cies to “unravel the bad policy more quickly, if the [new] majority is inter-
ested in doing so.”190 If Hill staffers are more ideologically committed and 
politically savvy, their presence would increase the whipsaw nature of 
agency regulation. 
Third, practitioners of Hill-style political hardball may be more adept 
at strategic obfuscation—that is, diverting attention concerning unpopular 
decisions—than are appointees without experience in politics. For in-
stance, strategic sub-delegations to civil servants may play a blame-avoid-
ance function. Relatedly, a savvy commissioner can encourage the use of 
guidance documents—which often alter regulated entities’ behavior and 
thus can be considered a form of “soft law”191—in areas in which a formal 
rule could trigger judicial review or political blowback. Finally, politically 
sophisticated commissioners seeking to reduce their agency’s involvement 
in a given area may push to reduce enforcement actions, which may attract 
less attention than would acting through rulemaking or adjudication.192 
2. Degrading Agency Culture 
Recent years have witnessed not just the swelling ranks of former Hill 
staffers on independent commissions and boards, but also marked changes 
in the culture of several important independent agencies, with overtly par-
tisan behavior encroaching on longstanding norms.193 In this Section, we 
                                                                                                                                             
188. E-mail from former commissioner of an independent agency to authors (Dec. 1, 
2018). 
189. E-mail from former commissioner of an independent agency to authors (Dec. 4, 
2018). 
190. Id. 
191. See Jacob Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 
61 STAN. L. REV. 573, 576 (2008). 
192. See Rory Van Loo, Regulatory Monitors, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 418 (2018). 
193. The SEC is illustrative. See, e.g., Floyd Norris, Independent Agencies, Sometimes 
in Name Only, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/09/business/inde-
pendent-agencies-sometimes-in-name-only.html [https://perma.cc/3DZ5-B2FP] (“The S.E.C. has 





describe the sharp-elbowed approach to politics that has defined Congress 
in recent decades. A similar style is beginning to manifest itself in several 
agencies, which we suggest the migration of Hill staffers to agencies has 
encouraged. 
We are cautious in making this causal claim. For one, many venues 
have become politicized in recent decades,194 making it difficult to isolate 
the independent effects of Congress’s culture on changes in agency cul-
ture—let alone to label Congress as a “patient zero” for this phenomenon. 
In addition, the evidence that one could marshal in support of or in oppo-
sition to this claim is necessarily impressionistic, further tempering our 
conclusions. Nonetheless, there is a real and important dynamic at play: 
congressional staffers-turned-commissioners have imported aspects of 
Congress’s hard-edged culture to their agencies, and this development 
merits further study. 
a. Congress’s Culture 
Four key themes characterize Congress’s organizational culture195: it 
is partisan; it values bellicosity; it tolerates dysfunction; and it rewards loy-
alty.196 Before describing how congressional staffers-turned-commission-
ers have imported these interrelated features into agencies, we provide a 
brief overview of the four features. 
                                                                                                                                             
past,] there is some evidence that the [P]resident generally gets to choose the chairmen of inde-
pendent commissions, but the other majority members are picked on Capitol Hill. The result has 
been that chairmen of commissions can find it difficult to accomplish anything.”); Labaton, supra 
note 17 (“The once-proud agency was so dysfunctional that it had no way of distinguishing the 
meritless from the significant among the more than 700,000 whistle-blower and investor com-
plaints it receives each year.”). 
194. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue? Political Polarization, the Su-
preme Court, and Congress, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 205, 242-44 (2013) (increased polarization on the 
Supreme Court); Markus Prior, Media and Political Polarization, 16 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 101 
(2013) (among media outlets); Boris Shor & Nolan McCarty, The Ideological Mapping of Amer-
ican Legislatures, 105 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 530 (2011) (in most state legislatures). 
195. We adopt the term “organizational culture” from management and business schol-
arship, where it refers to “a complex set of values, beliefs, assumptions, and symbols that define 
the way in which a firm conducts its business.” Jay B. Barney, Organizational Culture: Can It Be 
a Source of Sustained Competitive Advantage? 11 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 656, 657 (1986). Shared 
organizational culture fosters communication within the organization. See Alan Morrison & Wil-
liam J. Wilhelm, Jr., Culture, Competence, and the Corporation 2 (Oct. 2004) (unpublished man-
uscript), https://gates.comm.virginia.edu/wjw9a/Papers/culturecompetence2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9DRA-29UA]. 
196. For brevity, we consider Congress as a monolith in discussing its culture. In so doing, 
we gloss over cultural differences between the House and Senate. See Tara Leigh Grove & Neal 
Devins, Congress’s (Limited) Power to Represent Itself in Court, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 571, 605 
(2014) (noting that “the two chambers of Congress maintain distinct institutional cultures”). Cul-
tural differences also abound at the committee level. See, e.g., Richard F. Fenno, Jr., The Appro-
priations Committee as a Political System, 56 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 310 (1962) (describing local 
norms on one committee); cf. Kenneth Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative 
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First, Congress’s increasingly partisan atmosphere has been well doc-
umented. On more and more votes, an overwhelming majority of legisla-
tors sort by party.197 To illustrate this growing partisan divide, Figure 6 re-
ports the median Democratic and Republican senator’s first-dimension 
DW-NOMINATE ideal point estimate from 1963 to 2017.198 Legislators 
placed near -1 are considered very liberal; those near +1 are very conserva-
tive.199 As the figure shows, Senate Republicans have marched steadily to 
the right during this period, while Democrats have moved slightly to the 
left. 
 




                                                                                                                                             
Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 248-49 (1992) (distinguishing between the 
preferences of individual legislators and Congress as a whole and arguing that it is fruitless to 
attribute legislative intent to the product of legislators’ collective effort). 
197. See Frances Lee, How Party Polarization Affects Governance, 18 ANN. REV. POL. 
SCI. 261, 263 (2015). 
198. DW-NOMINATE sorts legislators in a multi-dimensional space based on the simi-
larity of their roll call voting records. Figure derived from Party Medians from DW-NOMINATE. 
Jeffrey B. Lewis et al., Voteview: Congressional Roll-Call Votes Database, VOTEVIEW, 
https://voteview.com/data [https://perma.cc/XUX8-L7TB]; see KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD 
ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ROLL CALL VOTING 23-24 
(2000). 
























































A similar figure for the House evinces even greater divergence in vot-
ing behavior by party200 The developers of the DW-NOMINATE metric 
conclude that “Congress is now more polarized than at any time since the 
end of Reconstruction.”201 
Second, Congress’s culture is adversarial.202 As longtime Senate 
staffer Ira Shapiro observed, “senators work in an acrimonious political 
culture that seems to offer little reward for substance and sees moderation 
and compromise as weaknesses.”203 Indeed, legislators arguably are in-
cented towards antagonism. According to Professor Frances Lee, parties 
win congressional elections by highlighting differences with the other 
party.204 Merely placing issues on Congress’s agenda that are popular with 
one’s constituents is not sufficient; legislators who want to see their party 
in the majority must push bills that “provoke . . . resistance” from the other 
party.205 That may mean scheduling message votes, meaning votes on bills 
and amendments that have no chance of passage but will compel one’s op-
ponents to make politically difficult choices.206 More generally, because “a 
party benefits from harming the opposing party’s image,” Lee writes, it 
must “look[] for ways to make its opposition appear weak and incompe-
tent, as well as ideologically extreme and out of touch with mainstream 
public opinion.”207 
                                                                                                                                             
200. Figure and data on file with the authors. 
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202. See Cynthia R. Farina, Congressional Polarization: Terminal Constitutional Dys-
function?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1724 (2015) (describing a “toxic party culture” in Congress). 
At first glance, adversary and polarization may seem like two sides of the same coin. But it is 
possible to disagree without being disagreeable. Cf. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, In Memoriam: Justice 
Antonin Scalia, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (2016) (reminiscing on the author’s friendship with Justice 
Scalia). 
203. IRA SHAPIRO, BROKEN: CAN THE SENATE SAVE ITSELF AND THE COUNTRY? 248 
(2018). 
204. FRANCES LEE, INSECURE MAJORITIES: CONGRESS AND THE PERPETUAL CAM-
PAIGN 2 (2016). 
205. Id. at 45. 
206. Id. at 142-43. 
207. Id. at 2; accord Farina, supra note 202 at 1727 (“[M]embers of both parties are mo-
tivated to engage in scorched-earth tactics intended not merely to stymie the other side, even on 
noncontroversial issues, but also to brand the opposition as incompetent, corrupt, or evil.”). 
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Third, Congress’s culture abides dysfunction.208 While one ought not 
to equate legislative inaction with dysfunction,209 the signs point to Con-
gress performing its lawmaking function poorly.210 Using the subjects of 
Congress-focused New York Times editorials as a measure of the size of 
the legislative agenda each year, Professor Sarah Binder charts the propor-
tion of those agenda items on which Congress fails to act in that year.211 
She finds a secular increase in the frequency of deadlock on these issues 
between 1947 and 2012.212 Congress’s record is no better for  once-ordinary 
tasks, such as budgeting and appropriations.213 Although whether a given 
action or lack thereof evidences “dysfunction” is ultimately a subjective 
determination, most observers would agree that chronic budget brinks-
manship leading to government shutdowns, an inability to marshal public 
resources to assist Americans after debilitating hurricanes, and an unwill-
ingness to act against a foreign country’s attempts to subvert U.S. elections 
all point to a malfunctioning legislature.214 
Rather than decry these developments and take corrective actions, 
Congress arguably encourages these machinations—and sometimes may 
even reward them.215 Congressional leaders devote a growing proportion 
of scarce calendar time to superficial message votes, which leaves less time 
                                                                                                                                             
208. Some political observers employ the term “dysfunction” as an all-purpose epithet in 
arguing that Congress is overly partisan or adversarial. See, e.g., James P. Pfiffner, Dysfunctional 
Politics in the United States: Origins and Consequences, 60 PAPERS ON PARLIAMENT 17, 17 
(2014) (noting that polarization and gridlock have caused American politics to become dysfunc-
tional). We, however, use this term in a narrower sense. After all, a legislature could be completely 
polarized into two warring factions and still perform its basic functions as a lawmaking body (as 
long as one faction holds a majority and majoritarian procedures govern the consideration of 
bills). Nevertheless, that does not describe the contemporary Congress. 
209. See Josh Chafetz, The Phenomenology of Gridlock, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2065, 
2075 (2013) (distinguishing between inaction due to a lack of sufficient public consensus and inac-
tion due to legislative gridlock). 
210. See Binder, supra note 130, at 93. 
211. Id. at 91. 
212. Id. at 93. 
213. See Balkin, supra note 79, at 1193; Lee, supra note 197, at 270. 
214. See Jennifer Hochschild, What’s New? What’s Next? Threats to the American Con-
stitutional Order, in CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS? 100 (Mark A. Graber et al. eds., 
2018). 
215. For instance, Representatives Eric Cantor (R-VA), Kevin McCarthy (R-CA), and 
Paul Ryan (R-WI) orchestrated a confrontation over a 2011 debt-ceiling vote that, if successful, 
would have caused the government to default on its debt, see MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 75, 
at 8-9, raising the cost of future government borrowing and possibly causing the U.S. economy 
and global capital markets to tank. See Terry Belton et al., The Domino Effect of a U.S. Treasury 
Technical Default, J.P. MORGAN (Apr. 19, 2011) https://valkayec.files.word-
press.com/2011/04/morgan.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RKZ-CKYZ]. After 2011, Representatives 
McCarthy and Ryan rose higher in the House leadership ranks, and Representative Cantor suf-
fered no internal sanction for his role. VALERIE HEITSHUSEN, CRS REP. FOR CONGRESS, 





for substantive issues.216 Leadership also has cut legislative support agen-
cies and staff resources, shortened the legislative workweek, and pushed 
rank-and-file members to spend less time in Washington, thereby reducing 
Congress’s institutional capacity.217 
Finally, Congress prizes loyalty from its staffers.218 That emphasis on 
loyalty—”an essential, paramount norm of congressional staff work,” ac-
cording to Professors Barbara Romzek and Jennifer Utter219—begins on 
the day a staffer is hired. As Professors Robert Salisbury and Kenneth 
Shepsle observe, since “staffers are hired by specific members and work 
under their direction, they soon come to accept a norm structure that em-
phasizes loyalty, of a very personal and specific kind, to be given to that 
member.”220 Accordingly, the central object of staffers’ loyalty is to the leg-
islator for whom they work.221 Most staffers also report a sense of loyalty 
to their chamber, and a smaller subset report a sense of loyalty to Congress 
overall.222 
That staffers serve as at-will employees further encourages deference 
and loyalty to legislators.223 Staffers do not benefit from the employment 
protections granted to most of the federal workforce.224 This lack of job 
security enables lawmakers to hire loyalists and fire renegades and ensures 
that current staffers will remain mindful of the importance of loyalty.225 
Given the need for staffers to respond to every whim of their principals, 
Senator John Glenn referred to Congress’s employment culture as “the 
last plantation.”226 
Staffers who are willing to accept these loyalty norms tend to advance 
in the institution.227 A survey of congressional staffers found that legisla-
tors, including committee chairs, tend to delegate greater responsibility to 
                                                                                                                                             
216. See Lee, supra note 197, at 271. 
217. See Farina, supra note 202, at 1726. 
218. See Christine DeGregorio, Staff Utilization in the U.S. Congress, 238 POLITY 261, 
262  n.3 (1995) (collecting citations of “[s]cholarly reports of the loyalty and deference staffers 
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219. Romzek & Utter, supra note 152, at 1265. 
220. Salisbury & Shepsle, supra note 101, at 394. 
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MIN. RES. 413, 422 (2000). 
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225. See Romzek, supra note 223, at 422-23. 
226. Id. 
227. See DeGregorio, supra note 218, at 273-75. 
 
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 38:175, 2021 
230 
 
staffers who demonstrate loyalty.228 By contrast, staffers who are moti-
vated by other goals, such as their own ideological or policy agenda, tend 
not to last long on Capitol Hill.229 
b. Exporting Culture 
Congressional staffers may similarly absorb norms of behavior from 
their institution—and carry these lessons with them later in their careers. 
Congressional dysfunction, such as it is, gets absorbed into the ethical and 
practical behavior of staffers, traveling with them when they leave the Hill 
for other government work. 
Organizational theorist Edgar Schein asserts that organizational cul-
ture is a “pattern of shared basic assumptions” that—importantly—is 
“taught to new members [of the organization] as the correct way to per-
ceive, think, and feel in relations to those problems” that the organization 
and its members face.230 The notion that social connections influence be-
havior is familiar to social scientists.231 In the government context, Profes-
sors David Fontana and Aziz Huq posit that officials are situated in an 
“epistemic community,” shaping the set of arguments and behaviors to 
which they are exposed—and establishing reputational costs for officials 
who deviate from their institution’s position.232 The result: a government 
official’s peer group affects her ultimate decisions.233 For instance, Profes-
sors Michael Frakes and Melissa Wasserman find marked peer effects in 
the rate at which patent examiners grant applications.234 Further, whether 
an examiner was hired during a period in which the Patent Office exhibited 
a “permissive granting culture” influenced that examiner’s grant rate 
throughout her career.235 
Several characteristics of congressional staffers render them particu-
larly susceptible to internalizing Congress’s culture. First, staffers tend to 
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join the institution when they are relatively young,236 at an age at which 
psychologists have found that beliefs and values are malleable.237 Second, 
they are situated in small, insular networks,238 which facilitate both the de-
velopment of uniform cultural practices and the administration of sanc-
tions for deviations from these norms.239 Third, working for Congress can 
be all-encompassing, with long hours and little time for family or outside 
pursuits that could expose staffers to countervailing influences.240 Finally, 
the combination of low pay, long hours, and lack of job security241 may 
discourage all but the most ideologically motivated individuals from work-
ing for Congress242—and this group may be more willing than the average 
person to adapt to Congress’s culture. 
We argue that staffers, after internalizing Congress’s norms of behav-
ior, carry these norms with them to their subsequent employment. In the 
private sector, managers’ early professional experiences earlier can influ-
ence their management styles decades later. For instance, CEOs with law 
degrees are associated with better performance for firms with above-aver-
age litigation risk.243 In another article in the same field, one of us has pro-
vided evidence that family environments strongly influence CEO decision 
making, with CEOs raised in poorer homes and those exposed to moderate 
family trauma outperforming CEOs raised in wealthier homes and those 
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[in Congress] have become increasingly unattractive for staff, making staff positions less appealing 
to those who lack strong partisan views”). 




Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 38:175, 2021 
232 
 
who experienced no or severe trauma in their youth.244 In a related vein, 
CEOs with military backgrounds are more effective managers during times 
of crisis than are CEOs without military experience.245 Further, combat 
veterans tend to make riskier, more highly leveraged capital structure 
choices as CEOs.246 
Naturally, these early-stage experiences may affect an individual’s in-
ternalization of norms of behavior. For instance, the aforementioned find-
ings concerning CEOs’ background suggest that lawyers-turned-CEOs ab-
sorb cautious, legalistic norms, whereas veterans-turned-CEOs are incul-
cated in a culture that values steadiness under pressure. Earlier profes-
sional experiences also may foster the development of a particularized set 
of skills. While it is difficult to disentangle the specific mix of cultural 
norms, skills, and other aspects of a previous experience that contribute to 
CEO behavior, presumably culture is part of the mix. 
In the context of government, federal employees who transition from 
one branch of government to another bring with them the perspectives that 
they socialized into during their service in their previous branch. Professor 
Robert Robinson has found that Supreme Court Justices with prior exec-
utive-branch experience are more deferential to the executive branch.247 
The extent to which they defer is positively correlated with the length of 
their executive branch service, suggesting that executive-branch socializa-
tion—and not the Justices’ preexisting attitudes—is driving this result.248 
Similarly, Professors Fontana and Huq posit that an Office of Legal Coun-
sel attorney with even just a few months of prior work for the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee will bring “a different sense of presidential power than 
the OLC lawyer who never left the executive branch.”249 
The experience of Republican senators who previously served in the 
House contemporaneously with former Speaker of the House Newt Gin-
grich offers another clue regarding the impact of institutional culture on 
subsequent behavior in another institution. Professor Sean Theriault 
charts these individuals’ Senate tenures, concluding that they “almost sin-
gle-handedly at first, propelled party polarization and escalated partisan 
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warfare in the Senate.”250 Not only did these so-called “Gingrich senators” 
amass a more extreme voting record than other Republicans,251 they also 
displayed a more aggressive, slash-and-burn posture.252 As Senator Alan 
Simpson (R-WY), who did not have a background in the Gingrich-era 
House, observed: “The rancor, the dissension, the disgusting harsh level 
came from those House members who came to the Senate. They brought 
it with ‘em. That’s where it began.”253 Governor-turned-Senator George 
Voinovich (R-OH) also drew a distinction between these former House 
members—of whom he thought there were “too many” in the Senate—
and “other people.”254 In response, senators in the “other people” category 
created an informal caucus as a counterweight to the aggressive, partisan 
strategies that former House members pushed.255 
What accounts for the cultural divide between Gingrich-era House 
members and other senators? Differences in their constituencies explain 
only about one-quarter of the variation in the two groups of senators’ vot-
ing behavior.256 Their personal characteristics—including age, religion, oc-
cupation, and other affiliations—offer little or no explanatory power.257 In-
stead, Theriault’s empirical analysis demonstrates that their service in the 
House during Speaker Gingrich’s rise in the 1980s explains much of their 
behavior.258 
These senators picked up several lessons in the Gingrich-era House. 
During this period, Gingrich and his lieutenants pushed the House Repub-
lican Conference towards a more aggressive posture, eschewing coopera-
tion with the Democratic majority to influence legislation in favor of draw-
ing clear contrasts with them.259 In drawing these contrasts, Gingrich and 
his allies favored short floor speeches which, according to Lee, “used harsh 
rhetoric and relentlessly charged majority Democrats with corruption, ar-
rogance, and mismanagement.”260 Gingrich himself saw his objective as 
changing the nation’s political culture, declaring that, whereas previous 
Democratic speakers “had been essentially legislative leaders . . . I, on the 
                                                                                                                                             
250. SEAN M. THERIAULT, THE GINGRICH SENATORS: THE ROOTS OF PARTISAN WAR-
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other hand, was essentially . . . seeking to do nothing less than reshape the 
federal government along with the political culture of the nation.”261 Rep-
resentatives-turned-senators adopted the House’s culture, internalized it, 
and exported it to the Senate. 
We argue that an analogous dynamic to the one Theriault identifies—
that one chamber’s culture can be exported to the other chamber—is at 
play concerning congressional staffers-turned-commissioners. Having de-
scribed how organizational culture can be inculcated, we turn to examining 
how norms of behavior in several key independent agencies have grown 
closer to congressional norms, just as these agencies have experienced an 
influx of new commissioners from the Hill. 
c. Absorption of Hill Culture? 
Assessing the ways in which congressional staffers-turned-commis-
sioners have altered their agencies’ cultures requires, first, describing the 
extent to which agencies’ cultures have changed in recent years and, sec-
ond, evaluating the extent to which these changes are attributable to an 
influx of former congressional staffers. Challenges abound at both steps. 
Culture does not lend itself to quantifiable metrics. Neither are there ob-
vious tests for cultural change. Given these hurdles, our discussion is nec-
essarily impressionistic—and our conclusions are merely suggestive. 
We begin by clarifying what we are not arguing. We do not assign 
complete responsibility for the increasingly polarized voting behavior 
within some multimember agencies directly to staffers-turned-commis-
sioners.262 To measure the ideological outlooks of staffers-turned-commis-
sioners versus other commissioners, we employ Professor Adam Bonica’s 
Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME), which 
considers individuals’ history of political contributions as revealed prefer-
ences of their political ideologies.263 We identify the absolute values of the 
ideological scores for members of ten agencies from 2000 to 2018, which is 
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the period when former Hill staffers reached a critical mass at agencies.264 
The mean value is 0.996 for former Hill staffers and 0.909 for other com-
missioners during this period. Although these values suggest that the ide-
ological views of former congressional staffers may be slightly more ex-
treme than other commissioners, the difference in means is trivial and, im-
portantly, does not approach conventionally accepted levels of statistical 
significance.265 Essentially, staffers-turned-commissioners likely are indis-
tinguishable from other commissioners in terms of ideological extremism, 
at least based on observable metrics. 
The finding that staffers-turned commissioners are just as ideologi-
cally extreme as other commissioners is unsurprising. Congress, multi-
member agencies, and the political class from which members of both Con-
gress and agencies often are drawn have all become increasingly polarized 
in recent decades.266 That partisan polarization is multicausal and is occur-
ring across multiple institutions simultaneously makes it difficult to tease 
out the independent effects, if any, of congressional polarization on agency 
polarization.267 
Instead, our claim is that the presence of staffers-turned-commission-
ers changed the culture of independent agencies. Specifically, the in-
creased prevalence of commissioners from Capitol Hill may have an inde-
pendent effect on the functioning of these agencies, apart from the effect 
of increased polarization in politics writ large. That claim—like most 
claims regarding the influence of culture on decision-makers—eludes de-
finitive tests.268 Yet clues exist. 
Consider the SEC. In 2002, reporters on that agency’s beat took no-
tice of its dysfunctional climate. According to the New York Times, the 
SEC’s decision process that year for selecting a chair for the nascent Public 
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Company Accounting Oversight Board “dissolved into partisan bicker-
ing,” leaving the position vacant and resulting in “squabbling and lack of 
cooperation spilling over to other commission matters.”269 These develop-
ments “threatened to undermine the credibility of both the [C]ommission 
and the new accounting board.”270 The handling of that selection process 
led to the resignation of SEC Chair Harvey Pitt, who remarked that “[i]n 
a partisan environment, criticism often devolves into attack,” which is 
“counterproductive.”271 
News accounts indicate that the SEC’s pathologies have persisted 
since then. In 2013, the New York Times reported that the SEC “has in 
recent years splintered into factions far more than ever before.”272 That 
article laid the blame squarely on staffers-turned-commissioners, noting 
that the two newest commissioners were former Hill staffers and quoting 
former SEC Chair Arthur Levitt’s observation that these commissioners 
“tend to embrace the philosophy of their mentors.”273 
Off-the-record conversations with senior officials at the SEC con-
ducted as part of our research support this claim. The consensus view is 
that the SEC’s culture has changed appreciably in the past few decades 
because of the rise of the former staffer as commissioner. As one SEC of-
ficial described, “There are things that we could be doing today—easy wins 
on policies that reasonable people on both sides would agree to—but we 
aren’t doing them because commissioners are not here to compromise but 
are just doing the bidding of their congressional masters.”274 Another sen-
ior official put it this way: “In the past, academics or lawyers were commis-
sioners, and they were used to bargaining and seeing the nuances of both 
sides. This made deal making possible. Today, things have gotten way too 
political around here. It is sad to see the lost opportunities.”275 The view is 
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shared by officials within the professional ranks of the SEC as well: “Yeah, 
I’ve seen a change in how things happen [on the policy making floor]. I’d 
say the pipeline from Capitol Hill has really changed this place for the 
worse.”276 
Or consider the NRC. In June 2011, an inspector general report 
charged that NRC Chair Gregory Jaczko engaged in hardball tactics with 
his fellow commissioners—for instance, failing to inform them of budget-
ary changes—in an effort to conceal his endeavors to cease work on the 
Yucca Mountain, Nevada, nuclear storage facility.277 One month later, 
journalists reported that a partisan cleavage developed at the Commission 
concerning measures to reduce meltdown risks at nuclear reactors.278 By 
the fall, other commissioners sent a letter to the White House expressing 
“grave concerns” with Jaczko’s leadership.279 The letter averred that 
Jaczko “intimidated and bullied senior career staff to the degree that he 
has created a high level of fear and anxiety resulting in a chilled work en-
vironment.”280 
And what was Jaczko’s background? In brief, he was a congressional 
staffer to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV), who opposed nu-
clear waste storage in Nevada.281 Given Jaczko’s biography, his aggressive 
pursuit of the objectives of his political patron is unsurprising. President 
Obama reportedly appointed Jaczko to the NRC at Senator Reid’s urg-
ing.282 
In addition to this anecdotal evidence of a more dysfunctional deci-
sion-making process at several commissions, a growing partisan split on 
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votes in several commissions also suggests that commissions may be fol-
lowing Congress’s lead regarding partisan polarization.283 Journalists de-
scribe partisan divisions on both high-profile commissions like the FCC 
(“bitter and partisan”)284 and on lesser known ones like the CPSC (“deep-
ening a partisan rift”).285 Indeed, the proportion of FCC decisions that 
were strictly on party lines has been creeping upwards since the 1990s.286 
Importantly, partisan votes may not fully capture the extent to which 
partisan fissures exist on commissions and boards. Voting records for the 
FCC, for instance, do not reflect that commission’s adversarial culture, in 
part because the FCC Chair can utilize his powers over personnel and 
budgeting to, as Professor Daniel Ho described, “dominate[] and bull[y] 
other commissioners into compliance.”287 
Finally, even when commissioners agree with an outcome, they are 
increasingly willing to write separately rather than sign onto their col-
leagues’ opinions. Again, the FCC provides an example; the proportion of 
FCC cases with a concurrence increased from a low of approximately five 
percent in the mid-1980s to almost forty percent in the mid-2000s.288 And 
when FCC commissioners decide not only to vote against the majority but 
also to issue a dissenting opinion critiquing the majority’s reasoning, those 
dissents tend to take an aggressive tone.289 
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Once again, examining observable behavior—namely, the frequency 
with which commissioners write separately—may underestimate the phe-
nomenon.290 For one, because the chair sets the agenda at many agencies,291 
a strategic chair may block agency consideration of issues on which the 
chair is in the minority.292 In this situation, a commission’s dissent rate 
would underestimate the degree to which the commission is fractured, be-
cause those issues on which the chair is on the losing side of a divided com-
mission would not come up for a vote. Further, differences in norms re-
garding the utility of pre-vote bargaining—which may have nothing to do 
with number of former Hill staffers in the agency—also stymie cross-
agency comparisons of dissent rates.293 
3. Improving Rulemaking Capacity 
Hill staffers may import not only Congress’s culture, but also 
knowledge of the legislative intent and substance of the statutes that their 
agencies administer. This expertise—which is certainly different, and in 
some ways deeper, than the statutory expertise that a private-sector regu-
latory lawyer would bring—may benefit their agencies in two respects. 
First, staffers-turned-commissioners who were involved in drafting a 
statute that their agency administers may be better equipped to exercise 
delegated authority. For instance, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act delegated poli-
cymaking authority to federal agencies concerning fifty-seven discrete pol-
icy areas.294 The SEC promulgated forty-six rules pursuant to these dele-
gations, including nine rules during the tenure of legislator-turned-SEC 
chair Christopher Cox.295 Given Cox’s prior involvement in drafting the 
Act—as a member of Congress, he served on the House Financial Services 
Committee and on the House-Senate conference committee on the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act296—Cox presumably was intimately familiar with the 
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scope of activities that the law authorized the SEC to undertake. Thus he 
could hit the ground running at the SEC. 
Second, to the extent that staffers-turned-commissioners have greater 
knowledge of the legislative history of their agencies’ organic statutes 
based on their time on Capitol Hill, they could use that expertise to con-
struct rules that are more likely to withstand judicial review. We do not 
presume that staffers-turned-commissioners have greater subject-matter 
expertise in general and thus are better able to craft rules that survive ar-
bitrary-and-capricious review. There is no reason to suspect, for instance, 
that a telecommunications law firm partner-turned-FCC Commissioner, or 
an FCC careerist-turned-FCC Commissioner, would be more or less 
knowledgeable of telecommunications law than, for example, the chief 
communications counsel of the House Energy & Commerce Committee 
would be. 
But we do think that the House counsel may possess greater expertise 
in one key area: the bill-drafting process and grasping legislative intent.297 
That greater expertise may benefit the agency when crafting regulations 
that later provoke litigation challenging the agency’s interpretation of the 
relevant statute. 
Agencies pay careful attention to legislative history and strive to en-
sure that their regulations adhere to the statute’s purpose—or, at least, do 
not stray far enough such that a court strikes down the regulations.298 This 
attention is justified, because under the Chevron framework, a court re-
viewing a regulation first evaluates whether the governing statute is am-
biguous and, if so, whether the agency’s interpretation of the ambiguous 
statute is “based on a permissible construction of the statute.”299 Some 
commentators observe that the D.C. Circuit has added an intermediate 
step to Chevron: whether the agency recognized that the statute is ambig-
uous.300 Others whittle the doctrine down to one step: whether the agency’s 
position is permitted as a matter of statutory interpretation.301 
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Under any of the views of Chevron, agencies that are skilled at statu-
tory interpretation will come out ahead. If an agency correctly recognizes 
that a statutory provision is ambiguous and demonstrates an awareness of 
the range of permissible constructions, we should expect that agency to 
enjoy greater success in statutory interpretation cases than a less adept 
agency would. Accordingly, staffers-turned-commissioners who drafted 
legislation while working in Congress presumably will be more successful 
rule-writers at independent agencies. 
IV. Implications 
The previous section of this Article argued that the placement of for-
mer Hill staffers onto commissions provides Congress with an important—
albeit indirect and subtle—power over regulatory policy. In this section, 
we draw out several implications of this assertion and offer suggestions re-
garding how each of the two political branches ought to respond to the 
staffers-to-commissioners pipeline. 
A. Enculturation as a Source of Congressional Power 
The most fundamental implication of our analysis is that Congress 
matters in more ways than one might think.  Congress’s levers of influence 
over administrative agencies extend beyond its conventional functions of 
lawmaking, budget, and oversight. 
That conclusion should be cause for at least partial reconsideration of 
the conventional notion that Congress is a moribund body. Growing con-
cerns that Congress is no longer a player in policymaking have generated 
a slew of reform proposals.302 Recognizing the severity of this supposed 
institutional lassitude, the House voted overwhelmingly in January 2019 to 
establish a Select Committee on the Modernization of Congress to address, 
inter alia, staff retention problems and bill-scheduling procedures that pro-
mote gridlock.303 These discussions understandably focus on how Con-
gress’s perceived pathologies affect that institution. 
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But with the growing placement of former congressional personnel 
into high-level positions in the administrative state, the legislative branch’s 
operations and culture may influence the functioning of institutions far 
from Capitol Hill in ways that members of Congress may not have antici-
pated. Like Johnny Appleseeds, staffers-turned-commissioners bring Con-
gress’s ways with them into the administrative state. 
If lawmakers desire to amplify their role in administration even fur-
ther, it would behoove them to pay closer attention to the organizational 
cultures of potential appointees’ past professional homes to a similar ex-
tent as lawmakers examine other aspects of their résumés. For instance, a 
communications lawyer who has served as legislative counsel earlier in her 
career may bring with her a different cultural outlook to the FCC than an 
otherwise identical lawyer possessing the same credentials and political 
views, but-for her lack of congressional experience. This difference, in 
turn, could have consequences not only for the functioning of the FCC, but 
also for Congress’s ability to indirectly influence that commission. 
While the idea that early-career enculturation will affect individuals’ 
later behavior is not novel, dating back at least to Plato,304 this insight de-
serves greater attention from those seeking to alter the relative influence 
of the political branches in administration. 
B. White House Countermeasures? 
Our last point is more controversial, but nonetheless follows directly 
from the evidence and argument presented above. Under current law and 
practice, independent commissions are, as their name implies, largely free 
from ongoing, operational White House control. While the Supreme Court 
has held that independent commissions are part of the executive branch,305 
and presidents of both parties have feinted in the direction of executive-
branch supervision,306 the President’s ability to control independent com-
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missions is limited. For instance, these commissions are not generally sub-
ject to White House supervision by the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB). Most significantly, unlike executive departments they are not re-
quired to assess the economic costs and benefits of important regulations 
and submit their analyses to OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (OIRA) for review.307 
There are many in the academy, government, and the bar who believe 
this degree of autonomy should be curtailed. Former OIRA Director and 
current D.C. Circuit Judge Neomi Rao expanded OIRA review of Internal 
Revenue Service regulations and “strongly hinted that independent regu-
latory agencies might be next.”308 Judge Rao argued that OIRA oversight 
promoted better regulatory practices across “all agencies that regulate the 
public.”309 President Obama also asked independent agencies to engage in 
retrospective cost-benefit analysis of existing rules,310 thereby encouraging 
them to adhere to similar principles as those that OIRA applies to execu-
tive agencies.311 
The notion that independent agencies ought to be subject to some 
form of White House review has the endorsement of the ABA’s Section of 
Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice. The Section’s 2016 report to 
the President-elect of the United States “strongly urge[d] [the President-
elect] to bring the independent regulatory commissions within the require-
ments for cost-benefit analysis, OMB review, and retrospective review of 
rules currently reflected in Executive Order 12,866 and Executive Order 
13,563.”312 
Our Article strengthens the case for executive-branch oversight. The 
rise of Hill staffers as commissioners undermines the claim that independ-
ent commissions are run by politically neutral technocrats. Indeed, these 
commissioners are increasingly political actors and thus should be subject 
to political controls. After all, in the strong form of our argument, Con-
gress projects its power into commissions through the presence of staffers-
turned-commissioners. It follows straightforwardly that the White House 
should be able to oversee this attempt to influence the administration of 
law. 
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One potential White House response would be to emphasize a “pres-
idential aide-to-commissioner” pathway that would crowd out the staffers-
turned-commissioners one. We counsel against that sort of tit-for-tat ap-
proach, based on the concern that it would do little beyond provoking an-
other round of one-upmanship. 
Instead, a President who endeavors to provide a counterweight to the 
power that Congress projects thorough staffers-turned-commissioners 
should consider subjecting independent agencies to cost-benefit analysis 
through OIRA review. That approach facilitates presidential control over 
agencies, delivering the highest-impact proposed rules from all corners of 
the administrative state to the White House door.313 Further, OIRA review 
arguably improves the quality of regulatory policy, encouraging economi-
cally efficient rules,314 checking cognitive biases facing agency personnel,315 
and serving as a central node to facilitate information aggregation and in-
teragency coordination.316 
On the other side, OIRA’s critics decry its relative lack of expertise 
in the substantive subjects that agencies address317 and claim that its judg-
ments are often ad hoc and politicized,318 among other infirmities.319 Alt-
hough we do not take a position on whether OIRA review is good for so-
ciety on net, we do assert that it is undoubtedly an effective mechanism for 
a President endeavoring to check Congress.320 
Conclusion 
This Article documents a sea change in the composition of independ-
ent regulatory commissions. Compared to a generation ago, commissioners 
are now more than four times more likely to be former congressional staff-
ers. This development is not a fluke. Rather, it represents a fundamental shift 
in the allocation of power among the branches of government. 
We have advanced a theory explaining this phenomenon, noting that 
it occurred around the same time as Congress’s influence over policy via 
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its other powers has eroded, and as the attractiveness of serving as a com-
missioner has increased for congressional staffers relative to other poten-
tial appointees. Placing loyal congressional aides onto independent com-
missions presents an alternative pathway through which legislators can in-
fluence public policy, which is increasingly delivered through the adminis-
trative state. 
Our story is not merely that as the executive branch asserted its influ-
ence in one way, the legislative branch responded by trying to counter it in 
another way, Instead, the Congress-to-commission pathway likely changes 
the way in which the administrative state operates. To the extent that for-
mer staffers take the culture of, and their connections to, Capitol Hill with 
them to their new jobs, then some of Congress’s pathologies may inhibit 
agency functioning. On the other hand, linking commissions with the legis-
lative branch may increase democratic accountability, provide meaningful 
oversight, and improve commissions’ understanding of congressional objec-
tives. 
Although the net advantages and disadvantages of this development 
for particular agencies or at particular times is uncertain, on balance, the 
rise of Hill staffers as commissioners strengthens the case for greater exec-
utive branch control over these agencies. Our data lay bare the reality that 
many of the heads of independent agencies are political actors, not neutral 
technocrats, calling into question the primary impediment to subjecting 
these agencies to executive branch oversight. 
